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Putting Distribution First
Robert Hockett*
It is common for normative legal theorists, economists and other
policy analysts to conduct and communicate their work mainly in
maximizing terms. They take the maximization of welfare, for example,
or of wealth or utility, to be primary objectives of legislation and
public policy. Few if any of these theorists seem to notice, however,
that any time we speak explicitly of maximizing one thing, we speak
implicitly of distributing other things and of equalizing yet other things.
Fewer still seem to recognize that we effectively define ourselves by
reference to that which we distribute and equalize. For it is in virtue
of that which we distribute and equalize that our policy formulations
treat us as politically “counting” or “mattering” for purposes of
social aggregation and maximization.
To attend systematically to this form of inter-translatability,
with a view in particular to that which maximization formulations
latently prescribe that we distribute and equalize, might be called
“putting distribution first.” It is explicitly to recognize the fact that
all law and policy are implicitly as equalizing and citizen-defining as
they are aggregative and maximizing, and to trace the many salient
consequences that stem from this fact. It is likewise to recognize
that all law and policy treat us as equals in some respects and as
non-equals in other respects. Putting distribution first by attending
explicitly to these “respects” yields greater transparency about how
well or poorly our laws and policies manage to identify, count, and
treat us as equals in the right respects.
This Article works to lay out with care how to put distribution
first in normative legal and policy analysis. The payoffs include
both a workable method by which to test proposed maximization
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norms systematically for their normative propriety, and an attractive
distributive ethic that can serve as a workable normative touchstone
for legal and policy analysis. Indeed, the Article concludes, much —
though not yet quite all — of our law can illuminatingly be interpreted
as giving inchoate expression to just such an ethic.

Introduction

Many legal theorists, welfare economists, and other policy analysts either

explicitly embrace or implicitly commit themselves to some normative “master
principle” in conducting and communicating their analyses.1 They argue that
all law and policy ought to concern themselves solely or mainly with “wealth”
or “wellbeing,” for example, or with “welfare,” “utility,” or some cognate
value. Most in such cases then say we should “maximize” the degree to which
the preferred value is realized. And so they’ll employ maximization formulae
— usually some variant of the venerable Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function — when they use formal methods in conducting or communicating
their analyses.2
1
2

See Robert Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe: Preferences, Policies, and
Imperatives in Law and Policy, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 391 (2009).
The locus classicus is Abram Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of
Welfare Economics, 52 Q.J. Econ. 310 (1938). See also Kenneth J. Arrow,
Social Choice and Individual Values (1951); Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations
of Economic Analysis (1947). I provide formal characterizations of my
own in Robert Hockett, Pareto Versus Welfare (Cornell Law Sch. Research
Paper No. 08-031, 2008), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1114&context=lsrp_papers, as well as where appropriate below.
The apparatus of social welfare functions is illuminatingly adapted to legal and
social policy analysis in Matthew Adler, Well-Being, Inequality, and Time: The
Time Slice Problem and Its Policy Implications (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law &
Econ., Research Paper No. 07-17, 2007) (on file with author). Also illuminating,
in a backhanded sort of way, is Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness
Versus Welfare (2002). A hint of the trouble with the latter is seen at once
on its face, the title itself manifesting a rudimentary category error: “fairness”
denotes a pattern of distribution, “welfare” an object of distribution which itself
is distributed fairly or unfairly. Essentially the same error figures in the title
of Eric Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1758
(2008). Foundational errors of precisely this sort are among those I hope to put
an end to by means of the mode of analysis proposed in this Article. For more
on objects and patterns of distribution, see infra Parts IV and V. For discussion
of distributors and recipients of distributions, see infra Parts II and III.
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It seems to escape notice that in doing these things, the theorist or analyst
does other things too. Implicitly, she thinks and advocates in terms not only
of maximizing, but also of distributing and, as importantly, equalizing. This
is because in socially maximizing anything, we always effectively distribute
another thing and equalize yet another thing. Moreover, we effectively define
ourselves, qua citizens, by reference to that which we equalize in these cases.
For the attributes in respect of which we are “treated as equals” are those in
virtue of which we are deemed politically to “count” for purposes of social
aggregation and maximization. They are the attributes in virtue of which we
are taken to be worthy of social, political, or legal consideration. And these
are the attributes to which we effectively “reduce” or assimilate ourselves
for legal and policy purposes.
Suppose, for example, that our analyst proposes we maximize aggregate utility
after the fashion of Bentham. In such case, she effectively suggests we distribute
benefits and burdens in manners that enlarge or enhance the utility aggregate.
She also effectively commits herself, however unconsciously, to the proposition
that those whose utility functions figure into her social welfare function should
be counted as moral or political equals in a particular respect: to wit, in respect
of their utility functions. For each person’s utility function, she will say, is to be
counted “exactly once” in constructing her social welfare function.
The respect in which our analyst counts these individuals as equals, in
turn, is the identifying feature to which she assimilates or “reduces” them
for purposes of collective political action. In the eyes of the strict utilitarian
countenanced here, for example, individuals are no more and no less than
their utility functions, so far as her conception of social welfare is concerned.3
The citizen’s utility function is the sole attribute in virtue of which she is
“counted” — i.e., in virtue of which she “counts” — in the Benthamite
utilitarian’s social welfare analyses. It is that attribute in virtue of which she
is counted “exactly once” just like everyone else, and that attribute in virtue
of which she “matters” for purposes of social welfare analysis.4
Now note the sense in which the observations just made amount to
observations concerning a form of what I shall hereafter call inter-translatability.5
3

4
5

Assuming that each individual’s utility function counts precisely for “one” in the
social welfare function. See infra note 13. It also is possible to weight different
persons’ utility functions differently — counting the utility functions of the
handicapped or desperately ill for more, for example, as some “prioritarian”
social welfare functions might do.
Assuming that yours is an unalloyed, “strict” welfare function. For more on
“strict” and “mixed” functions, see infra Part V.
Where analyses are conducted using formal methods, I shall refer to intertranslatability as “interformulability.” See infra note 10; infra Part V.
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Assume first that each of citizens Anscombe and Bentham has sufficient
resources upon which to subsist. Assume also that “we” as a polity have — or
that “society” has — an additional three units of resources available, which
we can direct toward Anscombe, toward Bentham, or toward both of them.6
Assume finally that Bentham would derive marginally more utility from
the resources in question than would Anscombe, until he has received two
units.7 Thereafter, Anscombe would derive marginally more utility from the
resources than would Bentham. If we are utilitarians and thus wish now to
maximize feasible aggregate social utility here, we shall give the first two
available units of resource stuff to Bentham, then impart the final available
unit to Anscombe.
Call the resources, after they are distributed in this way, “maximizing
units,” or simply “maximizers.”8 Call the resources, prior to distribution,
“generic resource” units, or simply “resources.” Then there are three, even
four ways to describe what we have done in distributing things as described.9
We can say we have “maximized” social utility, or “social welfare.” We can
say we have “unequally distributed” generic resource units — or resources
— ex ante, two to one in favor of Bentham over Anscombe. Or we can say
we have “equally distributed” aggregate-maximizing units — “maximizers”
— ex post over Anscombe and Bentham. And, of course, we can say that in
this latter, but in no other, sense we have counted Anscombe and Bentham,
whom we identify with their utility functions, as equals.10
6

You can think of it as money if you like, or some other resource transformable
into utility.
7 I prescind here from worries about interpersonal comparability, as do utilitarians
themselves.
8 They are accordingly characterized, not just in terms of their ex ante material
attributes, but in terms of their aggregate ex post utility effects when distributed
over a given population of individuals. These effects, that is to say, are “internal
to,” or “constitutive of,” the things as thus individuated. I thank Matt Adler for
pushing me to make this point more clearly. I hope I’ve succeeded.
9 Three ways if we assimilate equalization to identification, four ways if we attend
to these as distinct characterizations in their own rights.
10 Here is a summary rendition of the point in more formal terms: Maximization
imperatives typically are expressed as injunctions to “Max” the social aggregate
of something called “W,” the aggregate measure of which varies with something
experienced by individuals called “u.” W is accordingly, in the typical case,
said to be a “function” of individuals’ summed u-measures. Hence W = W(u1,
u2, u3, … um), where the numeric subscripts index the u-functions of the m
individuals who constitute the citizenry. And the imperative is to Max W = Σui,
where the Greek letter sigma indicates that we are summing, and the “i” subscript

2017]

Putting Distribution First

161

In sum, we have distributed resources unequally in a manner that counts
Anscombe and Bentham as equals in respect of the utility functions with which
we identify them — though in no other respect.11 And in so doing we have
maximized something believed by utilitarians to exist and to be normatively
interesting: aggregate social utility.12
This form of inter-translatability is more than a mere terminological curiosity.
Maximization-speak leads us to think in terms of maximization. And speaking
exclusively in such terms leads us to think exclusively in such terms.13 That
in turn conditions us to elide over certain normatively critical questions — in
particular, whether in maximizing one thing we are distributing, equalizing,
and identifying ourselves by reference to the appropriate correlative things,
indicates that we are to count each individual i’s u -measure in the sum. (This
summing of course requires interpersonal comparability, more on which later.)
Each individual’s u-measure, in turn, is itself typically viewed as a function
of benefits and burdens received or experienced by, hence distributed to, the
individual. So for each individual i, ui = ui (b1, b2, …bn), meaning simply that
the individual’s u-measure is a function of a vector (or “basket”) of n distinct
benefits and burdens (a positive function of the former, and a negative function
of the latter). Comparative contributions and detractions made by distinct b’s
to the u-measure of course imply commensurability, hence something like
“price ratios,” among the b’s (more on that, too, below). W is accordingly, in
the final analysis, a composite function W ○ ui ○ bj, or W(ui(bj)), meaning that
W is a function of aggregated u-measures, which are themselves functions of
aggregated b-measures. A quick formal way of putting the points made over
the previous few paragraphs, then, is to say that maximizing W generally
entails distributing b’s to individuals i, who are “counted” and treated as equals
for policy purposes solely in virtue of their u-functions, and in that sense are
“reduced to” or “identified” with those functions. In what follows I shall argue
that we should change our focus from that which is maximized to that which
is equalized, precisely in order to facilitate closer attention to what our policy
prescriptions — often erroneously, I shall argue — take us to be. We can do
this partly by changing our notation. I show how upon turning to what I call
“inter-translatability” and “interformulability,” below.
11 The “in no other respect” qualifier proves important for reasons that emerge
presently.
12 The existence in question is often contested, partly on measurability grounds.
I prescind from such objections here.
13 You likely know the word “maximandum” or its elliptical rendition, “maximand,”
for example. Do you know the words “equalisandum” or “equalisand”? They’re
in the same dictionaries as their maximizing counterparts. If you’re unfamiliar
with the terms, I suspect it is owing to the literature’s tending to proceed in the
language of maximization-speak.
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and hence whether we are even maximizing the right things.14 For intertranslatability works both ways: we maximize the right things when — and
only when — we distribute, equalize, and define one another by reference
to the right things.15
It is methodologically desirable, then, for all of us who aim to contribute
to normative legal theory or policy analysis systematically to analyze our
“maximization-speak” and maximization formulae with a view to their inherently
distributive, equalizing, and ultimately citizen-defining internal structures. Once
we have done this work of explication, moreover, we should do something
14 Suppose, for example, we believe in equal opportunity to engage in the production
of wealth. Then what we believe ought to be maximized isn’t just wealth, full
stop, but wealth produced under conditions of equal opportunity. Call it “equalopportunity-grounded wealth.” Call wealth not thus produced “opportunityindifferent wealth.” Then to act as to maximize opportunity-indifferent wealth is
to act as to maximize the wrong maximandum, by the lights of our commitment
to equal opportunity. It is best, then, to pay close attention to the linkages among
all four phenomena — maximization, distribution, equalization, and identification.
That way we enable ourselves to make use of the implications of competing
proposed laws and policies for all four as checks upon one another, in order in
turn to ensure that we’re maximizing, distributing, equalizing, and identifying
each other in respect of, the right things.
15 To see this more graphically, imagine a simple variation on the story of Anscombe
and Bentham considered above. Our society aims now to maximize aggregate
forehead height rather than utility. Assume that Anscombe’s forehead is higher
than Bentham’s, and that forehead height is genetically transmitted. Successful
transmission in turn correlates in straightforward linear fashion with resource
consumption, we’ll suppose. Now in the name of maximizing aggregate forehead
height, we distribute all three available units of benefit stuff to Anscombe.
Maximization of social forehead height, equal treatment of individuals in respect
solely of forehead heights, and disparate resource-distributive treatment of
individuals in consequence of their equal treatment in respect of their forehead
heights, then, come to the same here, just as before in the case of utility. My
guess is that you find this monstrous. The reason, I suggest, is that it is monstrous
to identify persons with their foreheads. And this is in turn why we will not be
persuaded by, say, a foreheadist’s rendition of the utilitarian’s favorite pseudoegalitarian defense of utilitarianism, to the effect that “we’ve counted each utility
function only once.” See, e.g., John Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic
Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. Pol. Econ. 309 (1955).
Counting every forehead “exactly once” is no more licit for purposes than is
counting everyone’s capacity to produce endorphins “exactly once” for that
purpose, and that is because societies are constituted by persons, not foreheads
or utility-factories.

2017]

Putting Distribution First

163

further: we should always be prepared to address the maximization, distribution,
and equalization components of our inquiries in reverse order.16 For the
question of what we take ourselves to be for legal and policy purposes is, in
a sense I shall soon indicate, normatively prior to the others; and the clearest
indication of what we are taking ourselves to be is what we are equalizing.17
Let us call the sum of these tasks — these “should”s — the task of “putting
distribution first.” This Article aims to commence the task of putting distribution
first for purposes of normative legal and policy analysis. It does so pursuant
to the following progression.
Part I sets the stage first by clarifying maximization and equalization
norms’ roots in what it calls “normative distributional assessment,” then by
preliminarily specifying the conditions under which such assessment is called
for. It then proceeds quickly to characterize five classes of question that all
law and policy bearing distributive consequences implicate, questions readily
derived from the grammar of verbs such as “to distribute.” The questions
are those concerning who is or ought to be distributing, what it is that they
are distributing, to whom, pursuant to what pattern, and via what practical
modalities.
After Part I has briefly schematized these normatively salient questions,
Parts II through VI systematically examine the best-known answers to them
proffered by legal theorists, philosophers, welfare economists and others
in recent decades. These classes of question jointly constitute what I call
“distributive structure.” Parts II through VI map this structure by reference
to what some linguists and philosophers will recognize as the cognitive
grammar of “to distribute” and its cognates. The “gaps” opened up by this
grammar — that is, the aforementioned “variables” for those who distribute,
those to whom they distribute, what they distribute, per what pattern and by
what means they distribute — yield guideposts that will prove useful as we
seek to structure our simultaneous attention to the full range of normative
questions that all law and policy bearing benefit- and burden-distributing
effects unavoidably implicate.
16 I thank Trevor Morrison for suggesting that I emphasize this point.
17 Why? In short, because our principal care is with what we are and whether
we’re treated accordingly. Plausible answers to the question in what respects
we are properly regarded as equals then proceed immediately from answers to
the identification question. Plausible answers to the question of what ought to
be distributed in what patterns and measures, in turn, proceed at once from our
answers to the equalization question. And thereafter, in turn, the appropriate
form of maximization takes care of itself: distribute the right things to the right
people in the right measures, and you will have maximized that which it makes
sense to maximize. For more on this matter, see infra Part V.
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Part VII suggests that a particular conception of appropriate distribution
— and in particular of what should be equalized and hence what should be
maximized — can be seen gradually to have emerged out of the discussion
over Parts II through VI. It also indicates that this conception lends itself to
readily practicable realization even in the face of feasibility constraints and
related legal- and institutional-design considerations. Part VII additionally
suggests that much of our law, and the normative considerations to which our
law gives expression, are best interpreted as an ongoing attempt to vindicate
the distributive ethic upon which the lines of Parts II through VI converge.
This prospect bears obvious practical consequences not only for lawmaking
in legislatures and, to a lesser extent, rulemaking in administrative agencies,
but also for legal interpretation on the bench.
In the latter vein, the Article concludes with suggestions concerning the
future agendas of a more ethically intelligible, as well as more conceptually
and formally rigorous, mode of legal and policy analysis informed by the
considerations of the foregoing Parts. It foresees a bright future for legal and
policy analysis that puts distribution first.

I. Distributive Circumstances and Distributive Structure
Before systematically discussing the distributive questions implicated by
all law and policy, it will be helpful quickly to perform two preliminary
tasks: first, to take brief stock of the circumstances in which the normative
assessment of distribution is called for; and second, to catalogue the implicated
normative questions themselves. This Part does both. It does so in preparation
both for Parts II through VI’s careful assessment of the answers to each of
those questions that have been favored by legal theorists and policy analysts
to date, and for Part VII’s attempt to set forth what I believe we have been
groping for all along.
A. Distributive Circumstances
Just about everything we find in the world is in some sense “distributed.”
Although not all such distributions are obviously subject to normative critique,18
18 The chairs and the table in one’s kitchen will be laid out in a certain arrangement.
They are “distributed” over the floor in a geometrically specifiable pattern. They
could be redistributed over that surface in many alternative ways. In the absence
of any purpose or value implicated by such arrangements, however, there will
be nothing to say whose upshot is that the arrangement “should” or “ought to”
be changed.
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many of them do implicate values and purposes — values and purposes
ranging from pragmatic to aesthetic to full-on ethical.19 Sometimes these
values or purposes are pressing. Normatively evaluable legal arrangements,
for example, have the effect of distributing perceived goods and ills over
persons. Evaluation can accordingly be quite normatively urgent in these
cases. Legal rules and rulings, statutory enactments, government programs
and policies all tend to yield “winners” and “losers” — recipients of benefits
and burdens at the receiving end, recipients by whom we wish to do right.
Patterns of such policy-wrought wins and losses amount, relative to each
status quo ante that they displace, to redistributions of perceived goods and
ills. These, like each status quo ante they supplant, are subject to normative
critique too. For they implicate the ethical propriety with which we are treated.
And the comparative ethical valences of varying distributive arrangements
of benefits and burdens are as compelling as any arrangements can be. More
than merely recommending actions, they typically require them.20
This much seems obvious once pointed out. What is perhaps less obvious
to some theorists is that even when allocations wrought by legal rules and
policies are neither foreseen nor intended, they remain ethically assessable with
a view to their distributive propriety. Particularly once brought to attention,
they are subject to normative claims to the effect that the arrangements are
right, wrong, better or worse, and should therefore, when possible, be improved
or deliberately left in place accordingly.
In this light, we will do well to take at least summary stock of the types of
circumstance under which distributive consequences can be said to be ethically
better or worse. The set is small, but important. We’ll call its members the
19 If you are sensitive to aesthetic or related considerations of “feng shui” or
geomancy, for example, even the spread of your furniture will lend itself to a
form of normative evaluation. Some arrangements will aesthetically dominate
others, so that you might incline toward redistributing your furniture until
it accords with the aesthetically “best” feasible arrangement. Like remarks
will be apt in connection with any other value under the aspect of which the
furniture arrangement might be intelligibly evaluated — ease of reading in the
late afternoon light, for example.
20 There is of course overlap, though it falls short of extensional equivalence, between
ethical and aesthetic assessment. Dastardly people or deeds are sometimes described
as “warped,” “grotesque,” etc. (The term “tort” itself is derived from the same
Old French root-word as “torture.” The root connotes twisting.) Just actions,
persons, and patterns often are found “beautiful,” “balanced,” “harmonious,”
etc. Fair allocations, moreover, like beautiful arrangements, often appear to
share some form of symmetry in common. (The word “fair” itself derives from
an Old English root that refers to the beauty of an attractive, symmetrical face.)
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prerequisites to normative distributional assessment’s being “implicated,” or
“apt.” I’ll specify them minimally and rudimentarily. Fuller detail will build
on the present foundations as we turn to distributive-ethical assessment’s full
logical form in Parts II through VI.
The minimal conditions for distributive-ethical assessment’s being apt
appear to be these: First, there must be things that can be variably distributed
— “distributed benefits and burdens,” we’ll call them. Second, there must be
beings to whom these things can be distributed — “beneficiaries or victims,”
we’ll call them. Third, those to whom the things can be distributed must hold
preferences or interests in respect of their receiving or not receiving them. This
delimits the class of distributed benefits and burdens that are potentially of
normative interest. Fourth, the recipients of distributions who hold preferences
or interests in respect of the same must hold legal or ethical claims to our
regard. They must be entitled to our consideration of their preferences or
interests as we distribute. Finally, fifth, all items the distribution of which
would be subject to ethical assessment will typically be “scarce.” There
must be potential for interests or preferences to diverge or conflict. It is in
such cases that we require principled and practicable means of “balancing”
beneficiaries’ potentially conflicting claims against one another.
So much for distributive circumstances, of which we shall find occasion
to remind ourselves periodically below. Now to the more interesting matter
of distributive structure.
B. Distributive Structure
Distribution, like any activity or action, is internally complex. It bears a
structure, a logical form. That form, unsurprisingly, finds expression in the
form of the infinitives that correspond to distributive action — verbs that
include “to distribute,” “to allocate,” “to mete out,” etc. Call a claim concerning
the rightness or wrongness, betterness or worseness of some distribution of
benefits or burdens wrought by law or policy a “distributive claim.” For a
distributive claim to be complete, hence determinate — that is, for it actually
to say or prescribe anything at all — it must fill all gaps opened up by the
“case,” “cognitive,” or “valence” grammar of “to distribute.”21 It must assign
21 Case, cognitive, or valence grammars divide sentences into predicate functions
— typically verbs — and their argument places. Most of the latter are then
filled by nouns and noun phrases, but in some cases they’re filled by adverbs —
predicates of predicates, hence second-order predicates. The number and kinds
of arguments that a predicate can take constitute its “valency.” See generally
Charles J. Fillmore, Toward a Modern Theory of Case, in Modern Studies in
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values to the variables that this and all cognate infinitives in effect “carry with
them.” For the claim to be intelligible, in turn — i.e., for it to “make sense”
— it must fill these variables in grammatically permissible ways.
I shall call any would-be distributive claim that fails to fill all requisite
variables “semantically incomplete.” I shall call any such claim that fails to
fill the variables in a grammatically permissible manner “syntactically illformed.” The contraries of these terms, unsurprisingly, will respectively be
“semantically complete” and “syntactically well formed.” I shall also make
use of a concept that I’ll call “pragmatic” completeness or incompleteness,
which will be easier to define momentarily, after I say a bit more about the
“variables” to which I’ve referred.
Two central claims that I aim to substantiate in what follows are these: First,
that a surprising number of influential normative legal-theoretic and distributive
claims found in the literature are semantically incomplete, syntactically illformed, or both. And second, that some superficially incompatible normative
legal-theoretic or distributive theories turn out on closer, “grammatical”
analysis of the kind that I here recommend, to be quite compatible. Their
compatibility is masked by the fact that two theories that fill one variable in
distinct ways can fill other variables in what I’ll call “compensating” ways
that produce extensionally equivalent distributive recommendations. The
sense in which this can be so, like the concept of “pragmatic completeness,”
will emerge as we turn now to the “variables” themselves, and to the ways
they can plausibly be filled.
What, then, are these “variables?” The short answer is that they are simply
the pronouns and what I shall call “pro-adverbs” that occur, italicized, in the
following questions: Who is the claimant addressing with what I am calling
a distributive claim? To whom does the claimant take the distributed item to
be distributed, or claim that it ought to be distributed? What does the claimant
take to be being distributed, or claim ought to be distributed? What pattern
does the claimant believe ought to characterize permissible distributions
to those recipients? And finally, how — by what literal means — does the

English 361 (David A. Reibel & Sanford A. Schaner eds., 1969); Charles J.
Fillmore, The Case for Case, in Universals in Linguistic Theory 1 (Emmon
Bach & Robert Harms eds., 1968); Studies in Linguistic Semantics (C. Fillmore
& D.J. Langendoen eds., 1971). The analysis of predicates as argument-taking
functions appears to have originated with Frege. See Gottlob Frege, Funktion
und Begriff (1891); Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen
nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, in From Frege to Gödel: A
Source Book in Mathematical Logic 5 (Jan van Heijenoort ed., 1967).
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claimant take the distribution to be practicable or feasible?22 As I say, this is
the short answer. The longer answer is what Parts II through V are devoted
to fleshing out.
I believe that the antagonists on opposite sides of many explicit or implicit
distributive disputes, when they really disagree at all, effectively disagree
over how one or more of the variables I have just catalogued should be
filled. The fact that such disputes often are implicit, however, enables this
fact to go hidden. It also, accordingly, yields one reason for bringing these
variables explicitly into the foreground: doing so affords clarity as to what,
if anything, is actually in dispute. Most of us, I believe, agree more than we
typically recognize on the question of how the variables ought to be filled.
Many apparently antagonistic distributive ethics actually prove, that is to say,
upon closer analysis to be quite compatible.
The variables I mention constitute a syntactic unity in the sense that any
sentence describing an action with distributive consequences implicates them;
it always makes sense to ask “who did this distributing,” “what did they
distribute,” and so on. But these variables also are semantically interconnected;
selection of particular values to fill one variable tends to constrain the ranges
of values with which we can plausibly fill others. At least this is so given the
foundational values that most of us seem to share concerning who we are,
what matters most to us, what we are responsible for, what in consequence
is fair, and hence what we ultimately owe one another.23 In consequence, we
shall see, a single distributive upshot — one essentially invariant, abstractly
specifiable pattern of normatively appropriate allocation — appears both to
follow upon and to constrain differing plausible fillings of the distributive
22 In effect, I supplement semantics-sensitive case grammar here with argumentplaces additionally derived from linguistic pragmatics. For a claim to be actually
made rather than simply entertained propositionally, it must be addressed to
someone, and must take into account means by which addressees can effectively
respond to it. In making this observation I am in effect melding classical valence
grammar with what Paul Grice would have called “conversational implicature.”
See, e.g., H.P. Grice, Further Notes on Logic and Conversation, in Syntax and
Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics 113 (Peter Cole ed., 1978); H.P. Grice, Logic
and Conversation, in Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts 225 (P. Cole
& Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975); H.P. Grice, Presupposition and Conversational
Implicature, in Radical Pragmatics 183 (Peter Cole ed., 1981).
23 If we think of the recipients of distributions as responsible agents, for example,
it seems more sensible to think of that which we ought to distribute as resources
rather than utility, since responsible agents “produce” their own utility out of
the resources they’re given. It is interlinkages of this sort that I have in mind
here. For more on this issue, see infra Part II.
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variables. Plausible conceptions of appropriate distribution turn out in this sense
to be rather like locations along an isoquant — a fair allocation “indifference
curve,” to put the point metaphorically.24
These claims are bound at first blush to ring somewhat surprising, if not
downright mysterious. But they can and should be substantiated. The best
way to do so will be to elaborate and critique the leading variable-valuing
candidates thus far expressly or impliedly proposed in the canonical normative
legal-theoretic and policy-analytic literature. Some of these candidates will
look at least passingly familiar to the general reader. But they do not appear
thus far to have been considered together, in systematically structured relation
each to all others at once. It is precisely this lack of systematic treatment, I
believe, that accounts for the obscurity I lamented in the Introduction: obscurity
as to the relations among distribution, equalization, self-identification, and
maximization.25

II. Conductors of Distribution: Distributors
Both policy and the laws through which policy finds expression generally bear
distributive consequences — in most cases intentionally so. Those who enact
and then act upon law and policy distribute things, whether intentionally or
merely in effect. So, then, derivatively speaking, “would” those who assess
24 An isoquant is simply a curve, different locations along which all take the same
value in some formal inquiry. Probably the most familiar isoquants are the
indifference curves endemic to microeconomic analysis. Changing x-coordinates
along the same curve are said to be “compensated for” by changing y-coordinates,
such that points corresponding to ordered pairs (interpreted, say, as “commodity
bundles”) are at home on the same curve and thus correspond to the same “utility”
enjoyed by a consumer. If we think of normatively appropriate distributions of
benefits and burdens as isoquant curves, we’ll see that here we are able to remain
on the same “curve” by changing characterizations of what we distribute, for
example, in response to changing characterizations of the pattern pursuant to which
we distribute it. More on this when we turn to what I call “inter-translatability,”
below.
25 In an important sense, then, the argument that follows is cumulative: no one point
will be fully appreciable until all points are made. But one must start somewhere.
And one can make piecemeal points at least provisionally appreciable, pending
further substantiation as one proceeds. Hence, I shall treat all of the variables,
and the best known candidates for filling them, in sequence. And I shall do what
I can in each case to look either forward or backward to other variables in the
sequence as necessary while I proceed.
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or evaluate law and policy.26 For in assessing or evaluating laws and policies
that bear distributive consequences, one effectively prescribes in respect of
such consequences. One says, in effect, how we ought, and how she would,
distribute. Who we understand the distributors to be, in turn, naturally will
tend to play some role in determining our particular distributive-ethical norms
— our “ought” claims concerning distribution. The converse holds just as
true. The duties we assert and the parties we take to be subject to them must
categorically “fit” one another.
Who, then, are the parties we take to owe each of us the benefit of acting
in conformity with our distributive “ought” claims? This question is probably
the easiest that must be addressed. For there seems little if any disagreement
over who the ultimate “distributors” are in most modern legal and policy
disputation, particularly in democratic polities whose governmental agents
are accountable to the citizenry. “We” — the sovereign populace or policy
community, all who are directly or indirectly addressed by normative legal
and policy claims of distributive propriety — are in effect treated as the
distributors.
We are “the people” — the citizenry of a particular polity or perhaps humanity
at large. We are all who take part, or bear rights to take part, in deciding what,
in the way of policies bearing distributive consequences, is or ought to be
done. Or we are “the policy community” — legislators, administrators, judges,
advocates, policy analysts, legal or political academics and others assumed
to be thinking or otherwise acting on behalf of that broader constituency.
In any of these cases, we effectively understand ourselves to be distributing
to or over ourselves so far as legal- or policy-theoretic debate is concerned.
One consequence of this fact is that the class of effective distributors in
a modern polity converges with that of effective beneficiaries — the next
variable that we shall address.

III. Recipients of Distributions: Beneficiaries
Distribution, like the infinitives that denote it, implicates not only subjects, but
indirect objects as well. Where there are distributions, there are beneficiaries
or victims — those to whom desirable or undesirable things are distributed.
And just as there must be “fit” between our distributive-ethical norms and the
way that we construe the distributors whom those norms always implicate,
so must there be fit between those norms and the ways that we characterize
the beneficiaries whose rights those norms vindicate.
26 I place scare quotes around “would” because the subjunctive tense in which I
mean to use the word here has grown less familiar than it once was.
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How, then, should we characterize or identify the recipients of normatively
interesting distributions of benefit and burden? What should we take them to
be? The fact that “they” are in fact “we” here affords guidance. Our being the
distributors, and our being accordingly responsible for the distribution that
concerns us, suggests certain salient facts about us in our roles as beneficiaries.
This appears not to have been widely recognized. Many legal and policy
theorists and analysts whom I shall discuss, by dint of the ways that they
characterize distributed benefits or burdens and distribution formulae (as
discussed below), effectively commit to a view of beneficiaries that lies in
tension with those beneficiaries’ likewise being distributors.
I am hoping that we might dissipate this tension simply by bringing it
explicitly into view. First, then, I shall sketch what appears to be the gradually
emerging consensus view of beneficiaries — the one on which most theorists
appear to agree when the question of how to construe them is explicitly before
them. Then I shall turn to the view that appears to me to be (implicitly) held
only by theorists who neglect to examine the presuppositions to which their
characterizations of distributed benefits and distribution formulae in effect
commit them.
A. Recipients as Agents
The consensus construal of beneficiaries that seems to have emerged over the
past several decades among those theorists who concern themselves explicitly
with distributive ethics meshes nicely with those beneficiaries’ simultaneous
role as would-be distributors. On this view, beneficiaries are construed as
what I shall call “boundedly responsible agents.”
Boundedly responsible agents, in large but not quite full measure, produce
their own wellbeing out of an antecedent stock of resources and opportunities.
It is therefore not only appropriate, but indeed requisite, that we hold them
— that is, ourselves — responsible in some measure for doing so. Boundedly
responsible agents also are constrained, to some not fully determinable
degree, in producing their welfare by the environments that they inhabit.
That is part of what “boundedness” means. Our innate or inherited capacities,
vulnerabilities, advantages, and disadvantages permit us broad, yet limited,
latitude in altering or exiting the environments in which we find ourselves.27
27 This understanding of ourselves in our distributive-beneficiary role seems to
be that which is most consonant with our role as the distributors implicated by
normative distributional disputation. It also coheres with our experience of action.
For we experience ourselves and others both as choosing and as indefinitely
constrained in that choosing — somewhat in the way that we recognize an

172

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 18:157

To conceive beneficiaries as boundedly responsible agents opens the
door to several salient, interlinked consequences for normative distributional
assessment. First, insofar as we view beneficiaries as freely choosing, we
also find it appropriate to hold them responsible in part for what they choose,
and hence to live with the consequences of many of their choices. This is
not simply a matter of punitive attitude. Nor is it even a matter merely of
incentives-sensitive efficiency, though such considerations can of course afford
further justification for the view. The responsibility correlate of agency is,
more compellingly, rooted in that form of dignity, or worthiness of respect,
that seems to be imminent in agency itself. It is part of what it is to view
beneficiaries of distributive ethics as agents — practical forgers, or subjects,
of fate — rather than as patients or addicts — mere passive objects of fate
— like children who “didn’t know any better” or “couldn’t do otherwise.”
Second, what strikes me as a surprisingly oft-ignored corollary of this
form of respect is the imperative that all agents must be viewed as equally
deserving of all forms of respect rooted in their agency. The reason for this
was suggested in the Introduction to this Article: with any conception of
who or what we are, there comes a corresponding conception of the features
in virtue of which we are taken to be moral, juridical, or political equals for
purposes of law and policy. And with the latter, as we shall see momentarily,
comes a conception of what we ought to be distributing — what we owe to
each other, so to speak — as well as in what patterns and measures.28
A third entailment of our construing beneficiaries as boundedly responsible
agents segues out of the second: insofar as we hold agent-beneficiaries in
some measure responsible for constructing or “authoring” their own selves
or lives, we will effectively commit ourselves to conceptions of distributed
benefits, distribution formulae, and distribution mechanisms that cohere with
that construal. We will commit ourselves, in other words, to such conceptions
as give corresponding latitude to the operation of responsible agency.
indefinite boundary surrounding our visual fields. Our “boundedly choosing”
experience of action, in turn, finds reflection in our capacities to experience
guilt and shame, pride and triumph. It is surely what underwrites ambition for
and frustration with self, resentment of and gratitude to others, and a host of
other such rationally contoured emotions. It also underwrites a host of cognate
“reactive attitudes” that we tend often to experience. All of these are attitudes
that “make sense” or are intelligible only under conditions of some degree of
freedom. The same complex of experiences of action — here in particular, the
“boundedness” portion — surely underwrites our tendencies to feel and extend
mercy, forgiveness, sympathetic understanding and charity toward self and other.
28 With the “owing each other” motif I am of course riffing on the illuminating
monograph of Tim Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998).
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We will thus view distributed benefits as ex ante inputs to individual
welfare or utility functions, assuming we think in such welfare-functional
terms as do many today.29 The functions in question in turn will be functions
whose “outputs” are largely the responsibility of beneficiaries themselves.
The distribution formulae that correspond to this view of beneficiaries, in
turn, will speak to the ex ante distribution of the mentioned responsibilityexogenous inputs. Those formulae will not be directly concerned with ex
post, responsibility-endogenous welfare-outcomes. They will treat these as
byproducts, mediated and endogenized by beneficiaries’ responsible agency
itself, as brought to bear in transforming resource and opportunity inputs
into welfare outputs.
Preferred distribution mechanisms, finally, will be those that give most
effective expression to these ideals. Such are the consequences of what I
have called “fit” among views of beneficiaries of distribution, objects of
distribution, and distribution formulae and mechanisms. We shall see this
abundantly borne out below.
B. Recipients as Patients
The remainder left by incomplete agency — the “boundedness” portion of
“boundedly responsible agency” — can be thought of, in the technical idiom
of grammar, as “patienthood.”30 Insofar as we really “cannot help ourselves,”
we are patients — objects of fate or of others. We are acted upon rather than
acting in such cases. Or we are children or addicts — people who literally
cannot resist or do otherwise than as we do.
Precisely to the degree that our agency is bounded, we are all patients. But
we don’t lightly admit or acknowledge this. Indeed, we are likely to feel a touch
of contempt, rooted I think in the perceived threat posed by exemplars with
whom we subconsciously but reluctantly identify, for any who are too quick
to admit limitation. This fact, along with the indeterminacy of the boundary
between choice and chance themselves in the many borderline cases we
seem to experience every day, I think gives rise to another tendency: we tend
29 See again supra notes 2, 10 and accompanying text.
30 I intend “patient” as used here, like “agent” before, in its grammatical sense — as
the recipient of rather than the initiator of an action. See, e.g., Bernard Comrie,
Language Universals and Linguistic Typology: Syntax and Morphology 42-43,
58-61 (2d ed. 1989); John Lyons, An Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics
340, 350 (1967); see also Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and
Practice of Equality 303 (“addicts”); Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution
Should There Be?, 112 Yale. L.J. 2291, 2295 passim (2003) (“patients”).
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generally to let the boundary “take care of itself” rather than attempt precisely
to limn it.31 We do so simply by trying as hard as we can, prospectively, for
as long as we’re able, then forgiving ourselves, retrospectively, when finally
we have to “let go.”
I suspect that it is for reasons rooted in facts such as these — as well as
in related concerns with incentives32 — that few legal or policy analysts
appear wittingly or deliberately to construe beneficiaries as patients. Some,
though, even if inadvertently, turn out effectively to commit themselves to that
construal. They do so through the positions they take in respect of appropriate
distributed benefits, distribution formulae, and distribution mechanisms —
positions whose logical consequences they don’t always appreciate.33 We’ll
see this in detail below as we turn to accounts of the mentioned benefits,
formulae, and mechanisms.

31 For an attempt “pragmatically” to limn it that demonstrates considerable ingenuity,
see John E. Roemer, A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian
Planner, 22 Econ. & Phil. 146 (1993); see also John E. Roemer, Equality of
Opportunity (1998). For a persuasive technical critique, see Mathias Risse,
What Equality of Opportunity Could Not Be, 112 Ethics 720 (2002).
32 Those incentives and their consequences are traced infra. In brief, letting agents
too readily “off the hook” results in the unjustifiable conscription of those who
act responsibly by those who do not. It also, and equivalently, results in ethically
cognizable inefficiency.
33 “Welfare” or “utility,” for example, when taken for the appropriate distributed
benefit, fixes attention on outputs rather than inputs. It accordingly proves
difficult, absent a Byzantine distribution formula, to be unambiguously welfarist
or utilitarian without effectively treating beneficiaries as patients, since focus on
outputs ignores agents’ roles in producing such outputs from inputs. Similarly,
because resources and wealth figure readily as inputs to beneficiaries’ welfare
functions, those who advocate ex post egalitarian resource or wealth distribution,
irrespective of beneficiaries’ responsible choices, likewise treat beneficiaries
as patients. In fact, any distribution mechanism that gives effect to some such
distribution principle as those just mentioned will effectively treat beneficiaries
as patients. By the same token, insofar as it falls short of egalitarian prior to, or
apart from, the operation of beneficiaries’ responsible choices, it will violate
ethical equality among beneficiaries and hence respect for their agency. It will
do so by in effect treating some beneficiaries as deserving of less than others
even when what are being considered are action-antecedent claims to material
opportunities upon which action and choice operate. More on all of this as we
proceed to our other distributive categories.
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IV. Objects of Distributions: Benefits (and Burdens)
Distribution and the infinitives that name it of course take more than the
subjects and indirect objects that implicate distributors and beneficiaries.
They take direct objects as well. Where there is distribution, there must be
distributed things — in the present context, distributed benefits and burdens.
Distributed benefits and burdens turn out to be ethical touchstones or “focal
points” for much distributive-ethical disputation. For whatever reason, they
have tended to serve as the principal banners under which other distributiveethical disputes — especially disputes over beneficiaries and distribution
formulae — are conducted. This will become clear as we proceed.
A. Welfare and Wellbeing
Probably the best known contemporary conception of aptly distributed benefits
has appeared under the names “utility,” “welfare,” “wellbeing,” “happiness,”
“satisfaction,” and cognate expressions. While we do find subtle distinctions
among various authors in construing these terms, they all share distinct family
resemblances that appear to stem from one guiding idea.
The idea seems to be something like this: “Doing,” or “faring” well is by
definition what matters to all of us. So, then, does well-faring, or “welfare,”
and so too does anything named by “welfare” synonyms — terms of art
such as “utility,” “satisfaction,” “happiness,” and so forth. Moreover, since
it seems natural, particularly in a pluralist society, to suppose that a fitting
measure of “faring well” is the degree to which one’s hopes, wishes, desires,
or preferences are satisfied, it becomes tempting even to define such terms as
naming whatever is effectively “yielded” or “produced” by the satisfaction of
preferences (or on some more perfectionist readings, whatever is produced
by the vindication of “interests,” be these “enlightened,” “rational,” “ideally
informed,” or otherwise). The line of thought here accordingly concludes that
law and policy ought to aim at “maximizing” welfare, wellbeing or utility,
since to do so is to maximize the degree to which preferences or interests are
satisfied and to which people accordingly fare well. Who but a curmudgeon
or misanthrope could object?
There are, as it happens, perfectly non-misanthropic objections. Cavils to
utilitarianism or “welfarism” typically target one or more of the following
features. First, its conception of “welfare” as construed by one or more of its
more eccentric or irresponsible advocates. Second and relatedly, its treatment
of welfare as a mere output that is summed up and socially “maximized,”
without regard to the way in which it is produced or distributed. And finally,
third, its treatment of welfare as literal, directly distributed benefit, which
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seems an impossible thing. I’ll briefly elaborate these objections in the order
just stated.
Construal-based objections to welfare as touchstone take a number of forms.
Most seize upon certain unduly narrow or strangely overbroad stipulations by
advocates as to what ought to count as well-faring. Some early utilitarians,
for example — Bentham and Edgeworth are probably best known among
them — suggested that all we should count as well- or ill-faring was hedonic
experience. Bentham dubbed this commitment the “principle of utility.”34
Edgeworth predicted that one day some manner of “hedonometer” would be
developed, which would equip us to measure utility much as we now measure
temperature.35 Ramsey and von Neumann made similar suggestions.36 Some
even today suggest that utility and disutility are reducible to endorphins and
C-fiber counts, respectively, much as “water” is now specified with definitive
precision as H2O, or “salt” as NaCl.
Suggestions of this sort draw predictable objections and equally predictable
responsive refinements. Best known among these, I suspect, are those of the
later Mill, Sidgwick, and more latterly Griffin.37 These responses take seriously
the observation that a life that fares well might be more than a years-long
orgasm or itch-scratching. Unfortunately, they continue to treat even their
refined renditions of welfare as singular substances of mysterious character,
the aggregate quantum of which is to be maximized. At least this is so until
such conceptions are sufficiently refined as no longer to lend themselves to
simple aggregation and scalar quantification. We’ll find more to say about
this upon turning to distribution formulae in the next Section.
34 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation 1 (1789):
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do.
. . . By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears
to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest
is in question.
35 F.Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics 81 (London: C. Kegan Paul and Co.
1881) (the “hedonometer”).
36 J. von Neumann & O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
17 (1944) (“Even if utilities look very unnumerical today, the history of the
experience in the theory of heat may repeat itself, and nobody can tell with
what ramifications and variations.”); F.P. Ramsey, Truth and Probability, in
Philosophical Papers 52 (D. H. Mellor ed., 1990).
37 See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863); Henry Sidgwick, Methods of
Ethics (1906); James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and
Moral Importance (1986).
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Today’s exponents of the earlier Benthamite crudity take a much different
tack than do the refiners just mentioned. Instead of disregarding all welfare
that isn’t hedonic in nature, as Bentham and Edgeworth did, they push to the
other extreme. They count as ethically cognizable “welfare” the satisfaction
of literally any preference whatever. If you want it, your getting it enhances
your welfare, end of story. This tack too has drawn predictable objections,
sometimes followed by refinements reminiscent of Griffin’s. Objections of
the form I have in mind here observe that a preference itself can be ethically
problematic. It can be so either “in and of itself,” so to speak — because, say,
expressly and even self-consciously anti-ethical — or as the product of, hence
as endogenous to, antecedent distributive circumstances that are themselves
ethically problematic.
It rings somehow dissonant if not ethically incoherent, for example, to
say of a terrorist cell that “it fares well,” or that “its wellbeing improves,”
when it succeeds in killing more innocents. Like remarks hold in the case of
a pirate, a rapist or molester, a thief, or what have you. The thief, after all, is
by definition the person who violates distributive norms. These are norms in
conformity with which “good” and “well” themselves must be understood,
if we aim to be able to make determinate prescriptions in respect of rightly
and wrongly distributed benefits and burdens at all. This is the sense in which
“the right” is indeed “prior” to “the good” — a deeper sense, I believe, than
that Rawls asserted; goodness, wellness and welfare must be understood in
manners that do not conflict with rightness — i.e., with distributive propriety.38
To call the malefactor’s satisfaction — that is, the satisfaction of one
who violates a distributive norm — “welfare” rather than “satisfaction” is to
confound his desert with his desire. That is in turn to jettison the distinction
between description and prescription, positive and normative, “is” and “ought,”
altogether. And that is in turn to relinquish the capacity to prescribe or evaluate
at all, hence to abandon normative legal or policy analysis themselves. Those
who construe welfare in this manner saw off the branch upon which they sit;
they effectively deny themselves the conceptual capacity to pursue the vocation
they aim to pursue — namely, to contribute to normative, as distinguished
from positive, legal, political, or economic theory.39
It is likewise misleading, if somewhat less jarringly so, to say of a slave
who has resigned herself to the alleged truth of what she is told of her putative
race-rooted “inferiority,” that “her welfare has improved” relative to what it
would be in some alternative circumstance in which she rejects the inferiority
38 For further development and elaboration of this line of criticism, see Hockett,
supra note 1; and Hockett, supra note 2.
39 Hockett, supra note 1; Hockett, supra note 2.
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claim and demands due respect. True, in contrast to the thief, we presume her
to be faultless in the hypothetical; hence we are able to view her acceptance
of her situation as affording some cognizable good that might partly mitigate
her otherwise unambiguously bad lot. But to claim without more that her
“welfare” is better when she believes false assertions of her putative inferiority
and accepts her enslavement is nevertheless misleading. For it fails to register
the profound wrongfulness — the distributive impropriety — of that very
circumstance which renders her resignation consoling, and thereby suggests
that the circumstance is legitimate. In this sense, it works a bit in the way that
a simple “no” in reply to the falsely premised “have you stopped beating your
spouse” question serves as accessory to the false premise itself. If we are to
maintain the distinction between positive and normative with any degree of
precision, then, it will be better in these so-called “tamed housewife” cases
to say that our protagonist “is resigned to her unjust circumstances,” rather
than that “her welfare is higher.”40
Objections to welfare as distributed benefit not rooted in particular construals
thereof, for their part, take root in the fact that welfare is not a directly
measurable or distributable substance. The physical distribution problem is
the most immediately transparent: whether we assimilate it to endorphins,
preference-satisfactions, “enlightened” or fully-informed or ethically-laundered
preference-satisfactions, etc., welfare just isn’t a thing we can directly mete
out. At best it is, rather, produced as an “output” by beneficiaries from physical
“inputs” — items literally meted out. This feeds into two lines of concern
raised by theorists who are not unalloyed welfarists.
The first is that those who would practically speaking be welfarist must
operationally be “something elseist” as well. Practically speaking, they must
advocate distribution of wealth, resources, opportunities, or some other such
thing from which welfare can be “produced.” The second concern is that,
because (a) welfare emerges from what beneficiaries do with whatever is
literally distributed, while (b) the distributed things are generally scarce, even
welfarists face the question of how to respond to beneficiaries’ capacities,
and hence arguably their responsibilities, to produce their own welfare out of
what they are allotted. The fuller significance of these lines of concern will
emerge more fully below when we turn to competing proposed benefits and
proposed distribution formulae.

40 I allude here to the instructive “Tiny Tim” and “tamed housewife” objections
raised by Gerald Cohen and Amartya Sen, respectively. See G.A. Cohen, Where
the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1997);
Amartya Sen, The Standard of Living (1987).
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Finally, there are well-known measurability concerns raised by welfare as
proposed distributional benefit. On most present-day understandings, welfare
no more lends itself to practical quantifiability or interpersonal comparability
in the holding than it does to direct distributability. Commensurability is the
one measurement task for which welfare does not present difficulties, since
in theory it serves as a numéraire in terms of which more concrete items
might be comparatively valued. The trouble, of course, is that in view of its
unamenability to actual quantification or interpersonal comparison, it can serve
as numéraire only “in theory.” It is of no practical use at all. But please hold
that thought till we cover the next proposed distributional benefit.
We shall presently see that in these mentioned respects, “subjective”
welfare is, measurability-wise, the inverse image of more “objective,” directly
distributable benefits. In fact, we shall find that both of these things — welfare
and the physical resources from which beneficiaries derive it — must be brought
together for distributed benefit-measurement problems to be addressed in an
ethically intelligible manner. This too, along with its practical consequences,
will emerge more clearly as we proceed.
B. Resources and Wealth
The principal competitors to welfare as proposed distributed benefit in the
literature take the form of material resources or wealth, further construed
in one manner or another. The more specific construals range from simple
and abstract to complex and concretely particular. The simplest and most
abstract characterization is simply as wealth — an “index” of some sort whose
internal complexity is ignored for theoretic purposes, or some ultimately priceindex-associated medium of exchange (in effect, money) that recipients can
transform into welfare by purchasing and consuming more variegated goods
and services.41 Characterizations whose internal complexity and concrete
particularity remain transparent include Rawls’s “index of primary goods,”
among others.42
41 This rough characterization of wealth, incidentally, is reminiscent of, but preferable
to, that offered by Posner in the 1980s as criticized below in Part VI. See, e.g.,
Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (1983). A suitable synonym for my
usage would be “purchasing power.”
42 See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 54-55, 78-81, 358-65 (rev. ed.
1999). I prescind from those complexities here. They are not germane to present
purposes and bracketing them accordingly does no harm. Fuller discussion is
found in Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited (Cornell
Law School Research Paper No. 06-030, 2006), http://scholarship.law.cornell.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=lsrp_papers (under revision for
Economics & Philosophy).
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Resources as prospective distributed benefits offer several advantages over
welfare. First, resources are directly distributable. Second and relatedly, they
are, in a sense shortly to be explained, reasonably measurable. Finally, third,
they leave space for the working of beneficiaries’ (bounded) responsibilities
to “produce” their own welfare. The satisfactions that beneficiaries enjoy
can ride largely on what they do with their resource allotments. This strikes
most people — particularly those who attend to recipients’ agency — as both
ethically right and, as a matter of incentives, efficient. This will emerge more
fully when we turn to distribution formulae and distribution mechanisms below.
Resources’ only disadvantages as distributed benefits stem from the degree
to which a theorist might sever questions concerning the propriety of their
spread from considerations of welfare. Where the severance is complete and
entire, resourcism devolves into fetishism. A case in point would be a theorist
who advocated the distribution of sand to everyone, under conditions in which
sand lacked significant use or exchange value. In such case the stuff that is
spread is best viewed as being not even so much as cognizable as “resource,”
“wealth” or the like. It cannot be so any more than, say, Nazis’ or thieves’
preference-satisfactions are ethically cognizable as “wellbeing.” Needless to
say, no theorist has advocated any such “resourcism” as this. But some, as
we’ll see in a moment, have permitted the link between resource and welfare
to attenuate.
The important point for present purposes is this: Resources qua resources are,
tautologously and yet sometimes forgottenly, always resources for something.
They count as resources, as distinguished from merely insipid, ethically inert
substances, only by reference to purposes, hence derivatively preferences, that
would-be users have for them. “Wealth” for its part, derived as it is from the
Middle English “weal” as in “common weal,” is cognate with “wellbeing”
itself. So resources or wealth, even to count as such, must be associated in
some manner with that which concerns the beneficiaries who engage our
distributive concern in the first place. And that is wellbeing. This raises a
question: In what way, precisely, must resources be tied to wellbeing to
count as resources? The full answer emerges only when we turn to proposed
distribution formulae and distribution mechanisms below.43
Relations between resource and welfare implicate measurement matters
as well as intelligibility concerns. Resources, in contrast to welfare, raise no
direct challenge where quantification and interpersonal holdings-comparison
alone are concerned. They do raise an indirect challenge, however, where
the ethical relevance of quantities and holdings are concerned. For ethical
relevance here, as just observed, is tied critically to welfare-yield. For related
43 See infra Parts V, VI.
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reasons, resources also raise a direct challenge where commensurability is
concerned. I sketch these challenges in turn.
The indirect challenge is this: Suppose that a given distributed benefit
yields differing welfare measures to differing beneficiaries. Suppose also
that welfare is part of what ultimately matters when beneficiaries engage our
normative concern. Recall finally that welfare itself is, as observed in Section
A, not practicably quantifiable or interpersonally comparable in the holding. If
we accept these three plausible premises, then it is not immediately apparent
what ethically cognizable advantage is offered by resources’ quantifiability and
interpersonal comparability advantages. Sure, we can measure them more easily
than welfare; but it is only by linking their measures to welfare measures that
we draw any ethically interesting advantage from that measurability. I’ll show
how to address this challenge when I turn below to distribution mechanisms.
Resources as distributed benefits also, I noted, raise a direct challenge. First,
note that resources are disparate. Now suppose also that no such resource is
properly subject to its own distribution formula without regard to the other
resources. Suppose, in other words (as seems plausible), that we cannot with
ethical intelligibility determine some rule for distributing one resource over
beneficiaries without also taking account of the distributions of all other
resources over beneficiaries. It will then follow that some means of indexing
will have to be developed for such terms as “total resources” or “wealth” to
bear distributive-ethically relevant content. But now note that de facto valuation
occurs when comparative weightings are assigned to vector components —
that is, to distinct resource types — in fashioning the scalar measure along
which “total resources” or “wealth” are to be quantified. Note also that any
such valuation that would be ethically satisfactory will again have to link up
with welfare, which we’ve already found to pose measurement challenges.
Otherwise we risk fetishism — the senseless valuing of a thing without regard
to its actual importance to anyone. It follows, in such case, that indexing —
i.e., commensurating — too will be problematic.
How, then, are we to reduce resources to measurability in an ethically
intelligible manner? How, in other words, are we satisfactorily to capitalize
on what I’ve cited as their practicability advantages over welfare in view of
their measurability? Fortunately, it happens, as I suggested a moment ago, that
a well specified distribution mechanism dispatches these problems. It allows
both for (a) unobjectionable indexing, and for (b) an ethically intelligible
coupling of readily measurable disparate resources with human welfare. I must
then once again ask the reader’s indulgence until we reach Parts V and VI.
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C. Opportunity and Access
One of the difficulties that Section B just observed in connection with resources
as proposed distributed benefits is a counterpart to the objectionable preference
problem that Section A observed in connection with some understandings of
welfare. This difficulty has in consequence led some to propose a distributed
benefit candidate that differs in the articulation, but at bottom amounts to a
mere fuller naming, of resources.
Here is how the thinking goes. Because welfare, or “advantage,” is what
matters to people, material stuff in and of itself is not ethically salient. That is
the “fetishism” concern mentioned in Section B. Furthermore, since material
resources are in fact variegated and thus in need of commensuration if they
are to be spread under one distribution formula, some common denominator is
required. The “common denominator,” in turn, is again welfare, or advantage
— the same thing to which resources must somehow be tied if they’re to be
bona fide resources, as distinguished from inert objects fetishized only by
theorists.
Why not, then, simply designate the item whose spread can intelligibly
engage our distributive-ethical concern — that is, why not designate the
appropriate object of distribution — something like “opportunity for welfare,”
or “access to advantage?”44 We might even continue to call this benefit
“resources,” or “wealth,” provided we keep the “opportunity” or “access”
understanding of those terms in mind. Et voila, we arrive at the influential
post-Rawlsian accounts of appropriately distributed benefits now associated
with Arneson, Cohen, Dworkin, Roemer and Sen.45
For reasons that are plain in light of Section B above, I think that “opportunity
for welfare” and “access to advantage” as so described are best understood
as alternative christenings of resources or wealth. Their advantage over the
44 See, e.g., R.J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 Phil.
Stud. 77 (1989) [hereinafter Arneson, Equality]; R.J. Arneson, Liberalism,
Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 19 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. (1990) [hereinafter Arneson, Liberalism]; G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of
Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906 (1989). An analogue in the case of welfare
would be someone’s suggesting we use “ethically compatible preferences”
instead. Just as the term “welfare” already connotes such conditions (in contrast
to “satisfaction” or “utility”), the word “resources,” I am claiming, already
connotes the conditions I note here.
45 Dworkin, supra note 30; Roemer, supra note 31; Cohen, supra note 40; Arneson,
Equality, supra note 44; Arneson, Liberalism, supra note 44; Amartya Sen,
Equality of What?, in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human
Values 307 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).
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terms “resources” or “wealth” stems from a possibility countenanced in the
same Section: that some might grow numb over time to the fact that resources
or wealth, in order to be resources or wealth as distinguished from ethically
inert material, must be resources for something. They must be understood by
reference to some purpose hence preference, and in that sense are “opportunities
for welfare” or modes of “access to advantage.”46
Resources and wealth thus represent, I shall say, “material opportunity.”
They afford opportunity to satisfy wants, to pursue plans, to live well-planned
lives, and in that sense to enhance ethically cognizable welfare, wellbeing, and
the like. Henceforth I shall accordingly use the terms “resource,” “wealth,”
and “material opportunity” more or less interchangeably, with occasional
caveats registered where necessary.47

V. Patterns of Distribution: Distribution Formulae
“To distribute,” like other verbs, does more than open variables for subjects
and objects. It also is subject to adverbial modification. Distributive claims,
as I dubbed them in Part I, in effect mandate conformity to one or another
such modification when semantically complete. They say, in effect, “things
are to be distributed thus: . . .” Such mandates are in turn subject to feasibility
constraints, to which they must also conform when pragmatically complete.
These in turn find expression in further adverbial modifications — claims of
the form: “things can be distributed thus: . . .”
In sum, completed, actionable distributive claims are replies to two
adverbially modified forms of question: we ask both “how ought?” and
“how can?” The class of possible replies to the second question effectively
constrains plausible replies to the first. In posing the first question, we are
asking for specification of what I call a “distribution formula.” In posing
the second question, we ask for specification of what I call a “distribution
mechanism.” I treat of the first here, the second in Part VI.
46 Rather as some seem to have grown numb to the fact that wellbeing is not
ethically unevaluated pleasure.
47 Such caveats as I’ll register concern the distinction that one must draw, in some
cases, between what I’ll call “ethically exogenous” and “ethically endogenous”
resources, wealth and opportunity. Ethically exogenous holdings are those one is
not responsible for; ethically endogenous holdings are those one is responsible
for. The discussion of distribution formula, below, elaborates the normative
significance of this distinction. The relevance of the distinction at present is
simply that the terms “material opportunity” and “resource” possibly connote
ethical exogeneity immediately to many, while “wealth” probably does not.
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There seem to be three leading candidate-families on offer where distribution
formulae are concerned. I call their advocates “maximizers,” “maximiners,”
and “egalitarians” of one stripe or another. Each family is best known through
one or two of its historically most influential members. I accordingly first
discuss each of the distinct families of candidates by reference to its best-known
members. Then I conclude both with observations on the inter-formulability
of maximizing and equalizing formulae, and with cognate observations on
the distributional equivalence of many distributive-ethical views that feature
differing “mixes” of variable-valuations.
A. Maximizing
The best-known maximizing distribution formulae on offer are those I call
“naïve” maximizing formulae. The operative ideal that prompts them is
disarmingly simple. It is that whatever we distribute should be distributed
in such manner as maximizes the quantity of some aggregate taken to be
normatively salient in its own right. Usually this means somehow-aggregated
welfare or wealth, summed over the beneficiaries who hold or enjoy it.48 If
distribution D1 yields aggregate wealth or welfare W1, D2 yields W2, and W2
exceeds W1, then D1 ethically dominates D2 on this view. Our goal, simply
put, is:
Max ∑ Wi,
1n
where “Max” means to maximize, “∑” means to sum, “i” indexes by beneficiary,
and “n” designates the number thereof in the society in question.49
Maximization in so bald-faced a form has, unsurprisingly, provoked
some objections. These include charges of (a) fetishism, (b) problematically
unequal treatment of beneficiaries, (c) objectionable construal of beneficiaries
as nonresponsible patients, and less often (d) some combination of these.
It is insufficiently observed, I believe, that the combined objection, (d), is
analytically the most satisfactory. For the separate objections are not really
orthogonal. Each of them tends analytically to entail the others, as I shall
now demonstrate.
48 Welfare aggregation and maximization are associated with utilitarian ethics.
Wealth maximization is associated with normative economics of law. For more
on this issue, see infra Part VI.
49 Please bear in mind that this is the form of “naïve” maximization formulae.
More on departures from the basic form as we proceed. See also supra notes
10, 14, 17 and accompanying text.
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Begin with (a), the fetishism charge. This one is typically directed at
naïve would-be wealth-maximizers rather than welfare-maximizers, though
this reflects a confusion that can and should be unveiled. The idea is that
maximizing wealth for its own sake, shorn of the proper ethical regard for
wealth-makers and -takers, is ethically indistinguishable from maximizing, say,
the quantum of orange-colored surface-area in the universe. There appears to
be no ethically cognizable reason for such a pursuit if it does not entail proper
treatment of beneficiaries each and all. And if it is indeed individuals who
ultimately matter to us where distributive normativity is concerned — as both
the dominant agent and patient construals of beneficiaries discussed in Part
III suggest — then what constitutes proper treatment of individuals should
be explicable without reference to any aggregate. It must be independently
specifiable.50
So far, so good. But now note that, though it is less often if ever observed,
naïve welfare-maximizing is subject to the same charge of fetishism as plagues
naïve wealth-maximizing. Welfare might well be — indeed might stipulatively
or otherwise trivially be — “what matters” to people. But if it is produced
by means that are indifferent to the proper identification and treatment of
numerically distinct, politically equal beneficiaries, then it is no less ethically
inert than are wealth or orange surface-space. For again, distributive-ethical
concern for individuals requires attention to the earned or otherwise deserved
wealth or welfare of each antecedently equal-rights-bearing beneficiary,
one by one. Non-fetishist, individualist normativity takes no cognizance of
any antecedently defined aggregate — even a welfare aggregate — in terms
of which individuals’ rights are defined and apportioned only a posteriori.51
To hold otherwise just is to hold that the aggregate’s distribution does not
normatively matter, hence that individuals and their political equality do not
matter.52 It is to place an unintelligible interpretation of “the good,” severed
from any ground in the individuals whose good it is, ahead of “the right.”
And that is precisely what is fetishist.
Recall now that I also mentioned (b) an unequal treatment complaint that
can be leveled at naïve maximization. In view of the immediately foregoing, we
For a reminder of the basis of this supposition, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
51 Indeed, as we’ll see in Part VI, to attempt this is not only ethically mistaken,
but analytically impossible. One cannot derive any determinate non-fetishist
distributive prescription from a would-be independent maximizing imperative.
52 Some such intuition underlies Robert Nozick’s “utility monster” objection to
utilitarianism. It is not accidental that Nozick commences his essay with the
observation that “individuals have rights.” See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State,
and Utopia, at ix (1974).
50
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can now see how this complaint might bear a conceptual link to the fetishism
charge, hence that the two charges might not be orthogonal. The link is found
in the possibility that whatever is naively maximized might be maximized
by means that in effect treat persons as being of ethically differing status,
even apart from their responsible and hence ethically endogenous choices.53
It might turn out, for example, that aggregate welfare or wealth would
be maximized simply by euthanizing people who are clinically depressed or
otherwise handicapped through no fault of their own.54 Or maximization might
best be effected in some populations by channeling resources or wealth toward
people blessed with high endorphin-productivity or otherwise strongly resourceresponsive utility functions. These would be people who, like Bentham in the
Introduction, derive disproportionate pleasure from what they receive relative
to others in the population.55 The fact that naïve maximization imperatives do
not prohibit channeling resources disproportionately in favor of such people
in principle — and indeed seem to welcome if not require such measures —
one can plausibly argue, demonstrates naïve maximization’s unsuitability to
serve as or underwrite an ethically defensible distribution formula.
Now for (c), the patient-treatment objection that I mentioned can be leveled
at naïve maximization. This one can be viewed as the flipside of the unequal
treatment objection. Hence it too, like the latter, is analytically tied to the
fetishism objection. The idea here would be that distribution that tracks morally
arbitrary characteristics of faultlessly disadvantaged persons56 does more than
treat these people as effectively expendable or legitimately subordinable. It
also treats arbitrarily advantaged persons57 as being of meritlessly higher
ethical or political status. It does so in complete disregard of that which
constitutes distributive beneficiaries as fellow citizens — namely, per Section
III.A. above, their responsible agency.
How does this harm the advantaged beneficiaries? Well, there is an
ethically important sense in which they are treated in what might be called
a “metaphysically patronizing” way. The advantage enjoyed is disturbingly
contingent, dependent as it is upon traits that the beneficiary is not responsible
for. Conferring advantages on beneficiaries in response to such characteristics
53
54

55
56
57

In such case, we might say they are treated as being “antecedently” or “exogenously,”
hence ethically essentially unequal.
Richard Posner professed in the early 1980s to be troubled by this possible
consequence in the case of utility-maximization, but then puzzlingly dismissed
the concern in the case of wealth-maximization. See Posner, supra note 41; infra
Part VI.
An internal relation, then, between unethically unequal treatment and fetishism.
Depressives and handicapped persons, say, as just countenanced.
“Utility monsters” and talent-Übermenschen, say.
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is in consequence alienating and demoralizing. One’s birth into a right to larger
distributive shares than those enjoyed by others is the product of a dubious
“blessing” rather than of the beneficiary’s ethically relevant responsibility.
This beneficiary is effectively born into a polity that treats her as a patient
— per the language of Section III.B. — and, indeed, as an object. For her
politically honored advantages are not really her own — they are not the
product of her self, of her agency — but instead a conditional gift conferred
by society in virtue of an accident. They are conferred simply because the
beneficiary is, as we might put it, “productively blonde.”58 The beneficiary
in such case is a mere funnel into which the channeling of resources simply
happens to produce a higher aggregate. That is profoundly disrespectful of
ethical personhood and ultimately in consequence damaging to the self. This
would be so equally in the cases of the fortunate and the unfortunate.59

58 Imagine a society in which blondes were so rare that birth with blonde hair was
viewed as a sign from the gods. A rare blonde is in consequence treated as an
avatar, maintained in a temple and endowed with sacramental gifts. Is there not
an obvious sense in which such “lucky winners” would experience themselves
as freakish, radically separated off from others? The sense in which this is
damaging to the putative beneficiary will be familiar to those who have read of
the psychological damage experienced by many members of royal and celebrity
families. It is also a staple of fiction concerning the longings of celebrities,
royalty, avatars and even angels to lead ordinary lives. See, e.g., Mark Twain,
The Prince and the Pauper (Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1882). Also
such films as Roman Holiday (Paramount Pictures 1953); The Last Emperor
(Recorded Picture Company, Hemdale, Yanco Films United, TAO Film, in ass’n
with Screenframe and AAA Soprofilms 1987); and Wings of Desire (Road
Movies Filmproduktion, Argos Films, Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Wim Wender
Stiftung 1987).
59 Because the favorable treatment is contingent upon morally arbitrary, accidental
features, and is accordingly withdrawable immediately upon even accidental
loss of such features. Some such intuition as this would appear to underwrite
the expressions of alienation, anxiety, and even humiliation sometimes heard
from people who are found physically attractive by large numbers of others.
Analogous concerns sometimes are registered by opponents of affirmative action
programs who have been beneficiaries of such programs. See, e.g., Clarence
Thomas, My Grandfather’s Son: A Memoir (2007). There is a link here to the
notion of a “right to punishment” as well. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & John
Hagel, III, Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal
Process (1977); P.S. Greenspan, Responsible Psychopaths, 16 Phil. Psychol. 417
(2003). The link is well drawn in Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment
(1866).

188

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 18:157

A final objection to naïve maximization stems from measurement
challenges of the kind enumerated in Section IV.A. If welfare is the polity’s
maximandum, the objection is that welfare does not lend itself to interpersonal
comparison in the holding with sufficient precision as to lend the idea of its
aggregation and maximization any practicable content. Where wealth rather
than welfare is the maximandum in question, the measurement objection seizes
on commensurability. There are no markets in many valued or potentially
valued goods and services, and in consequence the “wealth” we purport to be
maximizing constitutes an ethically incomplete index. Relatedly, one might
point to one or another variant of the so-called “Scitovsky paradox.” Here
one notes that, since two states can be Kaldor-Hicks superior to one another,
meaning that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not yield a reliable wealth-ordering
of possible distributions, the only known welfare economic conception of
“wealth” simply does not constitute an aggregate that is sufficiently determinate
as to underwrite an intelligible conception of “maximization.”60 I shall say
rather more on this subject upon turning to distribution mechanisms in Part VI.
Proponents of naïve maximization have a quiver full of standard rejoinders
to the objections just rehearsed. To the fetishism complaint, the welfarist replies
that welfare is “what matters” to people, while the wealth-maximizer observes
that wealth affords opportunity to satisfy preferences, hence welfare. In both
cases, the respondent concludes that maximizing cannot, in consequence, be
fetishistic.
Unfortunately, this style of rejoinder is simply a non sequitur. For the
fetishism complaint is not that welfare and wealth do not matter.61 It is that
their naïve maximization does not matter. The complaint, in other words, is
that naïve maximization misunderstands the ways in which welfare and wealth
matter. As distributed benefits or the raw materials thereof, welfare and wealth
of course matter to everyone. Indeed, as we noted in Section III.B., this is
tautologously so. The problem is that, when maximized pursuant to a merely
additive maximizing formula, they matter only, or at any rate disproportionately
in an ethically objectionable manner, to those who happen to be born lucky
enough to attract larger distributions by dint of their highly resource-responsive
60 See Tibor Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 77 (1941); see also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth
Maximization, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 509 (1980). The determinacy objection also
is grounded in distribution.
61 The rhetorically rich but perhaps overstated title of a well-known article by
Dworkin might be partly responsible for this misunderstanding. See infra Part
VI. The misunderstanding itself permeates D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth Is Value,
15 J. Legal Stud. 263 (1986).
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utility functions. Naively maximized welfare or wealth might of course matter
much to that fortunate few. But it will not matter in the same way to “us,”
whose collective responsibility is ethically to evaluate a proposed distribution
formula’s treatment of each antecedently rights-bearing constituent of that
inevitably benefit-distributing polity which we jointly constitute.
Naïve maximizers also have stock rejoinders that amount to non sequiturs
for the unequal- and patient-treatment complaints. To the unequal treatment
charge, the reply is that maximization counts each beneficiary’s utility or wealthproduction function “only once” in the social welfare or wealth function. One
wealth or welfare function, the claim runs, one “vote,” hence equal treatment.
We encountered this “Hail Mary” play above, in the Introduction.62 It, too,
is a non sequitur, for reasons also noted in the Introduction. It identifies
beneficiaries entirely with their welfare- or wealth-production functions —
as distinguished, for example, from their responsible agency. That reductive
misidentification constitutes a form of fetishism in respect of beneficiaries
that is the counterpart of the fetishism of naïve maximization itself in respect
of distribution formulae.
A human agent is no more her wealth- or welfare-function than she is her
nose or her forehead. Inasmuch as people are faultlessly and non-creditably
born with differing wealth or welfare functions,63 equal treatment of those
functions is unequal treatment of the people whose functions they are — just
as to treat people as equals in respect of their noses or foreheads would be
to treat them as unequals in respect of their personhood. And it is precisely
this to which unequal treatment objectors object.
Naïve maximizers’ rejoinder to the treatment-as-patients objection is
reminiscent of, yet also a partial misappropriation of, the claims about
beneficiaries made by objectors themselves. Here the reply first notes that
beneficiaries are at least partly responsible agents who act to produce much of
their own welfare or wealth. It then goes on to reason that, since distributing
to maximize welfare or wealth is to distribute in favor of the best, “most
efficient” such welfare- or wealth-producers, maximization coincides with
agent-rewarding.
Replies of this form have things half, but only half, right. The problem is that
they place the cart before the horse, and in so doing fetishize — attribute life
to — the cart. Here is what I mean: If beneficiaries are owed equal treatment
as agents ex ante, prior to taking the actions for which they are responsible,
then the “horse” should be distribution considered prior to the consequences
62 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
63 As is the case most dramatically, though not exclusively, in the case of congenital
depressives and handicapped persons.
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for any ex post aggregate. In other words, one should focus on inputs, not
output. For the output — the wealth aggregate — is ultimately just as much
the product of agents’ responsible actions as it is of the ex ante distribution
of inputs. Look to the propriety of the ex ante distribution of inputs, then,
and the appropriate output — the nonfetishist, ethically relevant wealth
aggregate — will effectively take care of itself. As an ex post matter, it will
be maximized “automatically” by our responsible agents. For it will be the
product of responsible actions taken with properly distributed inputs — which
actions are precisely what the output should track.64
As for the measurement-based objections to naïve maximization, proponents
of the latter do not seem to have arrived at any canonical rejoinder. This is no
accident. For the key to a satisfactory reply again lies in turning away from
reference to outputs, and turning to ethically relevant inputs instead. The
moment we do that, a strategy for satisfactorily addressing the measurement
challenges lies to hand. I defer elaboration, as noted before, to Part VI’s
treatment of distribution mechanisms. For this is where the answer is found.
B. Maximining
In recent years, a number of variations on maximizing views have gained
growing numbers of adherents. These “prioritarian” views, as they are now
called, take seriously some of the shortcomings of naïve maximizing just
discussed, and endeavor to correct them. We shall see that they do not quite
succeed. Probably the best-known prioritarian distribution formula is also one
of the earliest, developed well before the term “prioritarian” had been coined.
I refer to the “maximin” formula nowadays associated with — presumably
because defended most thoroughly by — John Rawls in operationalizing his
renowned “Difference Principle.”65
The guiding idea behind Rawls’s and many other prioritarians’ contributions
is something we noted in the previous Section. Many of the differences we
find among persons that might seem to recommend disparate treatment of
them pursuant to naïve maximizing imperatives are, as Rawls memorably
put it, “arbitrary from a moral point of view.”66 Differences of this sort,
64 Cognate observations apply to those maximizers who observe that maximizing
might tend to coincide with equalizing in view of the diminishing marginal
utility of wealth, or of whatever else is distributed. Quite apart from the claim’s
ignoring responsible agency and its reliance upon the happy accident of concavity,
it invites the question: if you’re serious about equality, why bother with naïve
maximizing at all? For more on this issue, see infra Part V.
65 See, of course, Rawls, supra note 42.
66 Id. at 72.
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Rawls concludes, precisely because they are morally arbitrary, should not
determine beneficiaries’ distributive shares. Instead, if we are serious about
identifying and treating one another as moral, juridical, and political equals,
these differences must in some way be neutralized where distributive ethics
are concerned.
Now, neutralizing morally arbitrary differences altogether, Rawls appears
to have recognized, would recommend some form of egalitarian distribution
formula. Rawls might even have thought that it would recommend what I’ll
call an outcome-egalitarian distribution formula, though Rawls is not altogether
clear on the matter.67 But Rawls himself shied away from any categorical
commitment to an egalitarian distribution formula in respect of either inputs
or outputs. For he took it to be ethically relevant that some departures from
equality can render even the “worst-off” among unequals “better-off” than
they would be under conditions of equality.
The possibility that equality in some possible worlds might be achievable
only by “leveling down,” in other words, left Rawls amenable to the prospect
that something short of full-bore egalitarianism might yield the most ethically
satisfactory distribution formula. The position at which Rawls ultimately
arrived was that departures from equal distribution — ignore the input/
outcome distinction for now — will be morally tolerable insofar as, but only
insofar as, they better the lot of “the worst-off.”68 Rawls labeled this guiding
maxim “the Difference Principle.”
If naïve maximizing raises the tide, and if a rising tide not only lifts all boats
but also lifts them so high that even the lowest are raised higher than would
have occurred under an egalitarian distribution formula, then maximization
will be ethically proper. But again, this will be so only on condition that “the
minimum” is maximized too. Moreover, differing distributions can even be
rank-ordered in keeping with this so-called “maximin” formula. The aim,
then, is expressible thus:
Max ∑ Wi,
1 n*
where “Max” again means to maximize, “∑” again means to sum, “i” again
indexes by beneficiary, and “n*” designates the best-off member of the worstoff class, hence the cut between “worst-off class” and all others. Maximin is
just the formulaic expression of Rawls’s Difference Principle. It is not now
the only, but it is the first and best-known, prioritarian distribution formula.
67 The sense in which it’s not clear will emerge presently.
68 There’s quite a leap here. But I aim here to exposit, not defend, Rawls’s chain
of reasoning.
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Both the Difference Principle and other prioritarian maxims prove on
reflection, however, to be only a bit better than non sequitur responses to the
specific objections that Rawls and others have leveled at naïve maximization.
They turn out in consequence to be coarse-grained remedies, if they are
determinate remedies at all. There are several reasons for saying this. First,
“the worst-off” class seems to be quite indeterminate in Rawls’s formulation.
For one thing, it is unclear whether it is the worst-off person, the worst-off
0.1% of persons, the worst-off centile or decile or quintile or whatever that
Rawls has in mind. Worse yet, it is unclear even how one is to decide. Rawls
offers no principle on the basis of which to decide the question, nor does any
particular such principle seem to recommend itself.69 The lack of a principled
basis for deciding this all-important question is troubling, particularly since
Rawls offers maximin precisely in order to neutralize morally arbitrary —
that is, unprincipled — determinants of distributive shares and thus afford
ethically satisfactory guidance to law and policy.
A related, but now more particular difficulty is this. Rawls does not appear
clearly to conceive, or even intelligibly to motivate, the idea of a “worst-off
class” by reference to any consideration of the reasons for anyone’s being
worst-off. Rawls draws no distinction, for example, between those who are
worse-off by chance and those who are effectively worse-off by choice — as,
for example, some might be if their status is the product of irresponsible or
deliberately self-destructive behavior. Yet if any ground of distinction among
persons that might be of interest to distributive ethics is not “morally arbitrary”
— and surely there must be some that are not if Rawls’s guiding predicate of
“moral arbitrariness” is to do any work — one would think it would be that
one. Such was the upshot of Section III.A. above, on responsible agency.
As if to register at least an oblique awareness of this cluster of problems,
Rawls’s full theory of appropriate distribution employed two more devices
apparently meant to bring some attention to responsible agency and equal
treatment back into his account. The first device was the familiar “veil of
ignorance” for which Rawls appears to be most widely known — somewhat
69 Rawls’s failure to offer a basis on which to make the cut does not seem to me
accidental. There is no principled basis. And that, I believe, stems directly from
the difference principle’s failure to address its own motivating concern — the
concern with morally arbitrary distinctions among persons that result in their
differential faring. The only principled means of addressing that concern, in turn,
not only supply a satisfactory theoretical baseline, but also render the Difference
Principle itself quite superfluous. Rawls thus emerges as an unstable resting
point en route from naïve to ethically cognizable maximizing — or what is the
same thing, from ethically non-cognizable to ethically cognizable equalizing.
For more on this issue, see infra Part VI.
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ironically, in that the device long antedates Rawls.70 The prima facie role
of the veil for Rawls was justificatory. The idea was that, in their roles as
distributors who choose distribution principles under uncertainty with which
they must subsequently live as beneficiaries, rational parties “would” select
maximin.71 The distribution formula could in that case be thought of as a sort
of “contract” freely entered into by citizens under idealized conditions whose
“ideality” sounded in impartiality.
As thus characterized, the veiled choice scenario is of course most apparently
prompted by the aim to ensure ethical equality through anonymity and
consequent impartiality. Choosers are rendered unable to benefit themselves
over others, because the characteristics that distinguish them from others are
hidden from their view. That is the ethically interesting form of “ignorance”
behind the veil of ignorance.
What Rawls perhaps less explicitly recognized, however, was that the
veiled choice’s being the product of a choice scenario rendered maximin at
least partly a responsible choice scenario as well. That is to say, by in effect
identifying beneficiaries and distributors as the same people, Rawls ensured
beneficiaries were, at least at some level of abstraction, responsible for their
own distributive shares. For they were responsible for the chosen distribution
formula pursuant to which those shares would be determined.72 The degree to
which this attribute of the veiled choice scenario explicitly motivated Rawls
is unclear. But it must have constituted at least part of its attraction. For the
linkages between ethical equality and responsible agency noted above in
Section III.A. are not hard to see. And the proposition that Rawls himself saw
it finds some support in the language Rawls used in motivating the second
responsibility-sensitive feature of his account to which I obliquely alluded
above. This is Rawls’s conception of the appropriately distributed benefit.
The second device by which Rawls at least implicitly — and we’ll see
only partly — addressed the responsible agency and ethical equality problems
that threaten the Difference Principle, then, was his characterization of the
appropriate distributed benefit. Rawls said that what ought to be distributed
is what he called an “index of primary goods.” This was, in the idiom I
adopted above in Part III, a lumpy and only partly scalable vector of disparate,
abstractly conceived resources and opportunities.73 Among the components
70 See, e.g., Harsanyi, supra note 15.
71 The reason for the scare quotes around “would” will emerge momentarily.
72 More corroboration here, I believe, of the deep interconnectedness of ethical
equality and responsible agency noted at various points in the foregoing subsections.
73 Rawls, supra note 42, at 54-55, 78-81, 348, 358-65. In light of the incomplete
scalability, of course, the index is but incompletely an index. See supra Part IV;
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were various material resources, but also what Rawls called “the social bases
of self-respect.” Liberty, too, was included, though in a manner through which
it could not be traded off for other primary goods — hence Rawls’s oft-quoted
lexicographical “Priority of Liberty” maxim.
Rawls was at least partly cognizant of the resonance with responsible
agency and ethical equality that selection of primary goods as appropriate
distribuendum afforded. For his explanations made at least occasionally overt
reference to the fact that selecting primary goods as distributed benefits holds
beneficiaries at least partly accountable for production of their own welfare.74
Moreover, Rawls expressly noted that to make primary goods the salient
distributed benefits is effectively to require that beneficiaries internalize the
costs that their life-plan-rooted preferences for primary goods impose upon
others.75 So Rawls appears, in virtue both of his reliance upon veiled choice
for purposes of distribution formula, and his reliance upon primary goods as
distributed benefit, to have been at least an incipient exponent of what I call
“material opportunity egalitarianism” in Section VII.A. below.
The problem for Rawls, I believe, lies in the “incipient” piece of this
description. For note, first, that Rawlsian primary goods bear no necessary
connection to maximin as distribution formula. The combination, rather than
constituting any manner of “natural fit” of the sort that I suggested in Part I
is needed, seems to be accidentally paired. Indeed, I shall now claim, they
amount to a clumsy and ultimately incoherent combination. For they render
Rawls a responsibility-tracer in his choice of distributed benefit, and a moral
accident-allower in his selection of distribution formula.76 The reason is
straightforward. It is that those who are “worst-off” in respect even of primary
goods holding might still be worse off either by chance or by choice, with
Rawls drawing no ethical distinction between the two prospects.77
see also Hockett & Risse, supra note 42.
74 Or in Rawls’s preferred idiom, the formulation and successful pursuit of their
own “plans of life.” See Rawls, supra note 42, at 80.
75 Id. at 359.
76 This is not surprising given Rawls’s ambivalence about responsibility. On the
one hand, he defends his selection of primary goods as distributed benefit by
reference to the importance of responsibility. On the other hand, at other points
he argues deterministically (and confusedly) that people are not responsible
unless able to choose freely, and that they are not able to choose freely because
they do not choose their faculties for choosing. See id. at 90-93, 182.
77 See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 Noûs 429 (1990).
Note that if leisure were counted a primary good, we wouldn’t even be able to
say that those poor in other primary goods through voluntary nonworking were
poorly off at all.
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Rawls’s characterization of maximin as the product of veiled choice might,
in theory at least, partly have lessened the volatility of the mixture just noted. At
least that might have been true had the choice actually been made, or had there
been any compelling reason to suppose that it “really would” have been made.
But theorists appear broadly agreed that the choice theory implied by Rawls’s
explanation of why maximin “would be” chosen behind the veil is “exotic”
at best.78 The choice it imputes to the hypothetical choosers is extensionally
equivalent to that which would be made by a chooser who is “infinitely” riskaverse.79 That makes it seem rather unlikely that the choice even “would” be
made, let alone that it is ethically satisfactory to treat beneficiaries as though
the choice has been made. Whatever trace of responsible agency the veiled
choice scenario lends to Rawls’s selection of maximin as the appropriate
distribution formula is accordingly much attenuated, if not obliterated.
Rawlsian justice theory, then, seems an unstable admixture that arbitrarily
conceives beneficiaries simultaneously as agents and patients, and aims to
be both responsibility-tracing and moral accident-permitting in its choice of
distribution formula. It is in that sense incoherent. The same holds, a fortiori,
of other prioritarian proposals, all of which simply vary on Rawls in respect
of how they define the worst-off, the weight that their distribution formulae
afford the worst-off, or both. In consequence, prioritarian maximining and its
variations seem to be only marginally more free of ethical arbitrariness than
the naïve maximizing they are meant to improve upon or supplant.
C. Equalizing
An influential alternative to maximizing and maximining over the last several
decades has been what I call “equalizing” of one form or another. The reasons
for that growing influence, I shall argue, are straightforward in light of the
Introduction’s observations concerning the link between equalization on the
one hand, beneficiary-identification on the other. The egalitarian distribution
formulae to which I refer come in several forms. Some can instructively be
characterized as “purifications” of original Rawlsian insights. Others cannot.
In the next Section, I demonstrate that proposals of the former, what I call
“sophisticated” variety can also be viewed as more ethically plausible forms
78 See John E. Roemer, Egalitarianism Against the Veil of Ignorance, 99 J. Phil.
167, 168 (2002).
79 See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Jehle & Philip J. Remy, Advanced Microeconomic Theory
260 (2d ed. 2001); Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on
Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70 J. Phil. 245, 254 (1973); L. Hurwicz, Optimality
Criteria for Decision Making Under Ignorance, 370 Statistics 1 (1951).
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of maximization itself — rather as Rawls’s “maximining” alternative was
meant to be. Proposals of the other, what I call “naïve” variety share flaws both
with naïve maximizing and with Rawls’s and other prioritarians’ insufficiently
purified version of it, as I shall draw out below.
The guiding intuition behind sophisticated renditions of egalitarianism is
helpfully articulated thus: Some differences among persons are both partly
causative of their differential faring — their differential “outcomes” — and
yet “arbitrary from a moral point of view” in the sense Rawls described.80 But
such differences are not the only causes of persons’ differential faring; also
playing a role in the latter are those persons’ responsible choices. If this is so,
then the most immediately satisfactory distribution formula would seem to
be one that first partitions each person’s holdings into portions Ri traceable to
moral arbitrariness, and 1–Ri traceable to responsible agency. That formula
then would recommend equalization of the former, while permitting and
indeed facilitating agents’ own maximization of the latter.
The morally arbitrary portion of any one person’s holdings, Ri, would thus be
invariantly valued across all persons i. It would be equalized over beneficiaries.
The nonarbitrary portion, call it Ei, would for its part be permitted — indeed
required — to vary across beneficiaries according as they expended varying
degrees of responsible effort in productive activities varyingly valued by a de
facto “market” comprising themselves and others.81 The correct distribution
formula then would be straightforwardly characterized thus:
∀i: Hi = Ei + Ri = Ei + R/n,
where “∀i” is read “for all i,” “Hi” designates each person i’s holdings, “Ei”
and “Ri” designate what they were said just above to designate, n is the
80 Rawls, supra note 42, at 72.
81 Leisure in such case would then not count as part of one’s “holdings.” But
it could be so counted. Hence the scare quotes around “productive,” and the
“themselves and” placed before “others” in the characterization. Were we to
count leisure as part of one’s holdings, we then would say that Ei’s composition,
rather than Ei itself, varies across persons i. A consequence would be that
maximization of the full vector of goods one enjoys “takes care of itself,” as a
straightforward consequence of responsible choices made by beneficiaries as
to the disposition of their resource endowments — Ri. Implications of “varying
degrees of responsible effort in activities varyingly valued by themselves and
others” are traced and treated below. The basic idea is that any surplus you end
up with over your mandatorily equalized ethically exogenous endowment is
properly a matter of what others give to you in exchange for what you give to
them. This proves particularly important in connection with the treatment of
distribution mechanisms below.
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number of persons i, and “R/n” designates the constant which is each i’s pro
rata share of the exogenously given residuum, R.82
We can call R “luck,” “ethically exogenous resources,” “ethically exogenous
material opportunity,” “the exogenous endowment,” “the responsibilityindependent residuum,” or anything else that connotes the same basic idea.
Those who would equalize Ri across persons might then be labeled “luckegalitarians,” “resource-egalitarians,” “responsibility-tracing egalitarians,”
“opportunity-egalitarians,” and so on. I shall call them the latter, for reasons
analogous to those that I offered above in Section IV.C. for treating “resources,”
“opportunity for welfare” and “access to advantage” as all being variants of
“material opportunity.”
Most who adhere to one or another rendition of the opportunity-egalitarian
view appear to recognize Rawls as a precursor.83 They view him as having
been an incipient opportunity-egalitarian. On this view, he simply did not
manage quite fully to purge his distributive ethics of the utilitarian naïve
maximization imperative he had set out to replace with a more individualist,
contractarian conception. Completing the job, the thought continues, requires
that we systematically treat (a) beneficiaries as boundedly responsible agents
in the manner of Section III.A. above, (b) distributed benefits as fully indexed
goods and services — that is, as Section IV.C.’s material opportunity — rather
than lumpy Rawlsian “primary goods,” and finally (c) the correct distribution
formula as that which distributes material opportunity in a manner that
thoroughly tracks the distinction between chance and choice.
The opportunity-egalitarian view of course has difficulties of its own. For
one thing, the divide between chance and choice — “Ri” and “Ei” above —
can be difficult to locate.84 The challenge afflicts any mode of distribution that
names heterogeneous material goods and services as the apposite distributed
benefits. One particularly poignant form that the difficulty takes is occasioned
by opportunity-egalitarianism’s facing the morally arbitrary determinants of
wellbeing head-on. For these determinants include very “personal” attributes
such as inborn talents and faultless handicaps. Hence to track the chance/
choice divide systematically, opportunity-egalitarians require some means of

82 R would be the sum of each person i’s Ri. That is, R = ∑ Ri. Summing here of
course requires commensuration and interpersonal comparability 1 n.
83 Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality, 109 Ethics 287 (1999).
84 See generally Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79
S. Cal. L. Rev. 45 (2006); Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?,
27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 74-75 (2005).
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commensurating these “person-internal” resources and deficits with “external”
such inputs to welfare functions.85
Formidable as they might initially appear, however, these challenges
are best viewed as minor retractions of the significant theoretic and, as we
shall see, practical advantages yielded by the opportunity-egalitarian view.
Competing orientations such as naïve maximizing and maximining do not
even self-consciously seek these advantages, let alone offer them in somewhat
challenged form. Such positions remain in consequence not just practically,
but foundationally short of distributive-ethical propriety. Failure to appreciate
this, I suspect, goes hand in hand with a failure to recognize that there is an
ordered set of approximations, “on the ground,” to the opportunity-egalitarian
distributive ideal, in a sense not found in the cases of naïve and prioritarian
maximizing. I draw this out briefly in Part VI, in connection with distribution
mechanisms.
Two final points bear noting in connection with equalization as a proposed
distribution formula. The first is that the opportunity-egalitarian principle
straightforwardly complements the view of beneficiaries as ethically equal,
boundedly responsible agents discussed above in Section III.A. It better
“fits” that conception of beneficiaries than do naïve maximizing, prioritarian
maximining, or what I shall presently call “naïve equalizing” below.
The second point is that the opportunity-egalitarian ideal also nicely
complements the view of appropriate distributed benefits as material inputs
to individual welfare that agent beneficiaries themselves are partly — what
Section III.A. called “boundedly” — responsible for producing. It better
“fits,” in other words, the selection of what Section IV.C. called “material
opportunities” as the ethically appropriate understanding of distributed benefits.
The same cannot be said for naïve maximizing or prioritarian maximining,
for reasons discussed above. Nor can it be said in the case of naïve egalitarian
distribution formulae, as I shall now indicate.
What do I mean, then, by “naïve” equalizing? I can best explain by reference
to some historic examples. First, then, note that some utilitarians historically
have argued on rather simple grounds for simple wealth-equalization. These
grounds are simple in the sense that they abstract entirely from any consideration
of beneficiaries’ ethical equality or responsibility for production of their own
wealth or welfare — in other words, beneficiaries’ agency. One such ground is
the naïve egalitarian utilitarians’ conjecture that utility functions are roughly
the same from person to person. The other such ground is the commonplace
85 This is a challenge, not a fault. The fault lies, on this view, with views that do
not so much as notice that such “resources” are among those that clearly are
morally arbitrary.
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that the marginal utility of wealth is diminishing in anyone’s utility function.
These conjectures together, if true, would jointly entail that rough equalization
of holdings will maximize aggregate welfare. Maximization of the utility
aggregate per the familiar utilitarian desideratum, in other words, would itself
require equalizing beneficiaries’ distributive shares.
While its outcome-egalitarianism might at least superficially resonate with
our views of the ethical equality of persons, however, the resonance is in fact
illusory. The reason is that the naïve egalitarian-minded utilitarian view treats
beneficiaries as patients just as any other form of utilitarianism does. It treats
beneficiaries as ethically inert “welfare factories,” into which wealth simply
is fed rather like infant formula into the baby animals at a petting zoo. It also,
not accidentally, treats beneficiaries as merely contingently equal, while in
a deeper sense very much unequal. For beneficiaries are treated as “equals”
only in respect of a contingently identical feature — namely, their utility
functions, which only happen to resemble one another per the egalitarianminded utilitarian conjecture. Meanwhile, responsibly diligent beneficiaries
are expropriated on behalf of, and thereby conscripted for the purposes of, and
in that sense subordinated to, the non-diligent. For again, all that is taken to
matter in this view is the utility aggregate, not the way in which it is produced;
hence those who work to produce can be expropriated for those who do not,
all in the name of the utility aggregate. Finally, the naïve wealth equalizing
view in effect treats aggregate welfare, not distributed wealth in the “material
opportunity” sense, as ethical focal point.86 For again, its distribution formula
is formulated in the name of the utility aggregate. The latter is its normative
touchstone. In short, then, naïve equalization of this sort remains a covert
rendition of naïve maximization.
Non-utilitarian welfare-egalitarians, as I call them, constitute another
group of those I am calling “naïve” equalizers who treat beneficiaries in effect
as patients and thus ethical, juridical, and political non-equals. They do so,
whether cognizant of the fact or not, by taking the following positions, which
effectively commit them to the “patient” characterization of beneficiaries.
First, they acknowledge that welfare functions can differ significantly across
persons. Next, in contemplation of that observation, they advocate differential
wealth-inputs across persons, precisely in order to equalize individual welfareoutputs. But this of course means that welfare-egalitarians hold beneficiaries
entirely unaccountable for their own welfare; instead of boundedly responsible
agents, they are altogether non-responsible patients. And this in turn means
86 It is also, of course and in consequence, another case of the cart’s being placed
before the horse. If wealth-equalizing is sought only by dint of its putative
aggregate welfare-maximizing, it is sought in pursuit of a fetish.
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that, like the utilitarian and naïve wealth-egalitarians countenanced above,
naïve welfare-egalitarians effectively recommend conscription, and in that
sense, ethical subordination, of the diligent to subsidize even the willfully
non-diligent.
Some advocates of these “naïve” equalizing views, I suspect, would abandon
them were they to be made fully cognizant of their implications. Others might
continue to advocate one or another such view, perhaps on the basis of one
or another eccentric or confused “cosmic” belief about agency. They might,
for example, be metaphysical determinists, who believe all persons “really”
amount to mere patients — patients of God or of fate or of “nature.”87 On
the basis of such a belief, the theorist might readily go on to conclude that
nobody “really” is responsible for anything, including any increment of their
welfare, and then draw as an entailment of that view the conclusion that all
should enjoy equal welfare.
Against this backdrop, we can discern a sense in which naïve welfareegalitarianism might be viewed as a degenerate case of the opportunityegalitarian position. If one somehow were able, for example, both intelligibly
to suggest and empirically to establish that nobody “really” is responsible for
anything, then welfare-egalitarianism and opportunity-egalitarianism would
coincide, extensionally speaking. For one could then simply set Ei trivially
at zero for all values of i in the formula set out above. This would then give
formulaic expression to the idea that nobody is “really” responsible for
anything, including for any portion of her own welfare or resource-holdings.
There would in such case be no ethically interesting reason to distinguish
between opportunity-inputs and welfare-outputs.88
Symmetrical remarks would hold for welfare-maximizing utilitarianism as
described above in Section V.A. If it were intelligibly possible and empirically
plausible to hold every person responsible for everything rather than nothing

87 I confess to finding it difficult to make sense of this position. By its own criteria,
it would be prompted in the saying by metaphysical necessity rather than the
proponent’s free acceptance of the truth. We who hear the claim likewise will do
whatever we do as mere effects of the same occult causes rather than in response
to reasons. Reason-giving itself, such as determinist claims amount to, seems
to presuppose freedom of the only kind that matters — that which underwrites
attribution of responsibility. But alas, I must leave the free will problem there
for the present.
88 I mention this prospect, however, merely as a theoretical curiosity. For I do
not see how the antecedent conditions — establishing that we are not “really”
responsible for anything — could be satisfactorily satisfied. Even so much as
to articulate the position would seem to be self-refuting.
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— even the entirety, say, of her utility function89 — then one might set Ri
trivially at zero for all values of i in the above-stated opportunity-egalitarian
formula in recognition of that putative “fact.” Persons i then could be said to
be treated as ethical equals in virtue of their each counting for one and there
being no ethically exogenous residuum for which they were not responsible,
which is precisely that component of agents’ distributive shares that opportunityegalitarians prescribe that we distribute equally.90 Again there would be no
ethically interesting reason to distinguish between opportunity-input and
welfare-output.
Once again, however, the antecedent condition — beneficiaries’ being
responsible for everything — looks impossible to maintain either plausibly
or, even, intelligibly.91 It is on all fours with the suggestion that people are
responsible for nothing. We seem, in other words, to be stuck with the divide
— that between chance and choice — which underwrites the view of agents as
“boundedly responsible,” per Section III.A. above, in the first place. Recognition
of this hazy boundary seems to be both opportunity-egalitarianism’s theoretic
blessing and its occasionally pragmatic curse.92
A final point that I think worth drawing out in connection with equalization
concerns its relation to a venerable ideal — that of fairness. “Fairness,” I think
all who are attentive to English usage would agree, connotes impartiality,
even-handedness.93 Familiar synonyms of the word include “equitable,”
“just,” “unbiased,” “treating like cases alike,” and the like.94 To treat parties
fairly is to treat them as equals in respect of the purposes of the treatment.
It is to eliminate or neutralize inequities that are exogenous to the purposes
of the treatment, and to retain or vindicate inequities that are endogenous to
the purposes of the treatment — precisely in proportion to their endogeneity.
Suppose, by way of example, that the purpose of the treatment in a particular
context is to distribute valuables in accordance with responsible agency and
89 Demanding a Panglossian happy attitude, say, or Schopenhauerian resignation
or Neitzschean amor fati.
90 On such a view, you could presumably be held responsible for your forehead
height too. You’d be responsible for everything. Hence you could be identified
with everything. Another reason here, I suppose, to call people like the early
utilitarian Sidgwick “eyes of the universe.” See Bart Schultz, Henry Sidgwick:
Eye of the Universe: An Intellectual Biography (2004).
91 Neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche managed to pull it off, for example. And
Pangloss of course was the butt of a joke.
92 “Largely surmountable,” again, for reasons that emerge supra Part III.
93 It bears virtually no recognizable relation, incidentally, to Kaplow and Shavell’s
proffered definition in Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2.
94 See, e.g., Fair, in Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
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nothing else — in particular, no morally arbitrary feature of the beneficiaries.
Fair treatment in this context would then seem to be treatment that allocates
value to beneficiaries in proportion to their creditability — their responsibility
— for value-production.95 It will also, a fortiori, be treatment that equally
allocates valuables for the production of which no one is responsible, since
everyone is equally responsible for that residuum. Fair allocations, in other
words, will be those that equalize holdings of such stuff as no one is responsible
for, and require holdings for which persons are in fact responsible to vary in
proportion to their responsibility. If I am right about this conjecture, then the
class of fair allocations just is the class of opportunity-egalitarian allocations.
The opportunity-egalitarian view is the “fair distribution” view.
D. Interformulability
This Part’s discussion of distribution formulae thus far suggests a nice formal
method by which to illustrate the point with which I introduced this Article.
I said in the Introduction that to maximize one thing is to distribute another
thing and to equalize yet another thing, with the latter thing amounting in turn
to some attribute with which we identify beneficiaries. Section C’s observation
just above, that certain equalization formulae can be construed as degenerate
cases of maximization formulae and vice versa, affords some preliminary
corroboration of the point. Let me now generalize the point formulaically.
The following translation rule captures the idea I am trying to get across.
For any aggregative maximizing imperative of the form:
Max ∑ ui,
in which u-factors are summed, we can translate the summand, ui, into a
counterpart equalisand, ui*, and state the same imperative in this fashion:
∀i: Eq (ui*),
where “∀i” is read, “for all i,” and “Eq” means to “Equalize” just as “Max”
means to “Maximize.” In other words, rather than summing u factors and
maximizing the sum, we enjoin our functionaries, equivalently, to equalize the
summand’s egalitarian counterpart, u*. Since there is always a counterpart,
we can always work the translation.96
95 “In proportion to . . . creditability for value-production” requires, if it is to bear
content, commensuration of disparate items and services, then cardinal valuation
of agents’ inputs along the resultant index. See infra Part VI.
96 Though of course conceptual and idiomatic dexterity would be required in many
cases, in some of which there would be little more than theoretical interest in
the translation exercise.
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Here are two brief examples to help make the point plain. Suppose first
that we are garden variety utilitarians. We wish to maximize aggregate utility.
That means that we aim to maximize the sum of ui measures over individuals i.
The summand in this case is each individual’s “utility” measure, as ordinarily
construed by utilitarians. This summand’s egalitarian counterpart, u*, is
straightforward. It is what prioritarian utilitarians would call the “weightings”
of those individual utility functions employed in determining the utility
aggregate. The prioritarian utilitarian assigns more weight, in determining
the social aggregate, to the utility functions of those who are worst off or
otherwise disadvantaged. The garden variety Benthamite utilitarian, by contrast,
assigns equal weight to all individual utility functions. Each individual’s
utility function receives a weight of one. This weighting is accordingly what
the utilitarian social welfare function equalizes. Precisely this point is what
prompts some utiltiarians to purport to be egalitarian, as we noted earlier.97
But what these same utilitarians seem not to have noticed is what I mentioned
at the outset. The feature in virtue of which a social welfare function treats
us as equals — our equally weighted utility functions — is also the attribute
with which that function identifies us for policy purposes. The social welfare
function “reduces” us, in other words, to our utility functions; our utility
functions are all that we are for purposes of social aggregation. This reduction
might cohere well with our view of beneficiaries if, say, we construe them
— and hence ourselves — as non-responsible welfare factories. But it will
not thus cohere if we view beneficiaries — hence ourselves — as boundedly
responsible agents in the manner discussed in Section III.A. This takes me
to a second example that we can instructively compare to the utilitarian one
just countenanced.
Suppose then that we reject utilitarianism in view of the way it construes
us in our capacity as beneficiaries. What it instructs us to maximize —
“utility” — sounded plausible enough initially, if for no other reason than
that the name of this maximandum rang technical and even exalted. But then
we find, on analysis, that what it tells us in effect to equalize and identify
ourselves with is out of keeping with what we know ourselves to be. It
misidentifies that feature of ourselves in virtue of which we take ourselves
ethically, politically, and hence legally to matter. How might we give formal
expression to a suitably adjusted view of what law and policy ought properly
to concern themselves with?
Here is how. We can straightforwardly formulate what we find a more
satisfactory legal and policy imperative in the very same terms as the utilitarian
did. We simply convert this more apt form of identification and equalization
97 See supra note 15.
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— that is, the proper understanding of beneficiaries and distributed benefits
— into a maximizing formula. We proceed, in other words, from u* to u in
this case, reversing the order by which we arrived at utilitarianism’s de facto
u* in analyzing its maximized sum of u’s.
Let us briefly recapitulate the steps. If we are opportunity-egalitarians,
per Section V.C., we shall aim to equalize the distributed benefit described in
Section IV.C. — material opportunity — over beneficiaries whom we view
as boundedly responsible agents, per Section III.A. The latter, recall, actively
transform opportunities into welfare. Now note that in transforming their
opportunities into welfare, these agents are, in the aggregate, generating a
form of social welfare. Let us call it “equal-opportunity-grounded welfare.”
Is not this form of welfare, then, precisely what we wish to see maximized? Is
it not that maximandum which corresponds to what we take to be the appropriate
equalisandum? The only differences between this form of welfare and that
of which utilitarians speak are that this form, first, proceeds from antecedent
conditions of equal opportunity, and relatedly second, is produced in part by
responsible agents.98 But these distinctions make all the ethical difference in
the world. For utilitarian welfare, by contrast to equal-opportunity-grounded
welfare, is indifferent to the opportunity backdrop and the responsible agency
of beneficiaries. Its welfare aggregate is in that sense differently generated,
hence is a different species of welfare aggregate altogether. Process is partly
constitutive of product here, as one might put it.99
This all suggests, I believe, that the formal representations of utilitarian
and opportunity-egalitarian norms can be rendered schematically identical,
hence are themselves in effect structurally identical. They are isomorphic;
they share a form — what I am calling the structure of distribution itself.
Only the particular valuations given the schematic variables u and u* vary
between them. Both equalize u* over individuals, and both maximize the sum
of individual u-measures. They differ only in respect of what they assign to
those variables and thus what they equalize and maximize.
Where they differ is, specifically, these two respects: First, in utilitarianism’s
interpreting u* as the weighting assigned to individuals’ exogenously given,
98 The role played by the agents in generating the aggregate, in turn, suggests
that our task as an operational matter is to equalize opportunity, leaving the
transformation of that opportunity into welfare to the beneficiaries. “Leave the
driving to us,” the beneficiaries might say. For more on this, see supra Part III,
in connection with distribution mechanisms.
99 The description under which the product in question is individuated, that is,
includes essential reference to the generation-process. Process is “internal” to
product in such case. See supra note 8.
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birth lottery-conferred utility functions; while opportunity-egalitarianism
interprets u* as the material opportunity afforded those same individuals. And
second, in utilitarianism’s interpreting that u whose sum over individuals is to
be maximized as “utility,” a measure that is indifferent to beneficiaries’ agency,
bounded responsibility, or opportunity; while opportunity-egalitarianism
interprets that u as “equal-opportunity-grounded” welfare, a measure that is
not indifferent to those characteristics of agents.
The cardinal point is that both of these distributive ethical views maximize
something, and both of them equalize something. In both cases, moreover, we
treat as maximandum the right thing if and only if we take as equalisandum the
right thing. Not to recognize this is to leave oneself vulnerable to incoherence.
An instructive case in point, in fact, comes immediately to mind. There is
much avoidable confusion, I believe, in the theoretical literature concerning
a putative distinction between the so-called “consequentialist” nature of
maximizing imperatives on the one hand, and the “deontological” nature of
fairness — that is, opportunity equalizing — imperatives on the other.100 One
even encounters surprising claims to the effect that norms of the latter sort are
inherently “ex post” in orientation, while those of the former sort are more
“ex ante” in orientation.101
But the straightforward interformulability of equalizing and maximizing
formulae just demonstrated suggests straightaway that this distinction is
facile and arbitrary. It is drawn on the basis of an unwarranted fixation on the
accidental surface features — as distinguished from the “deep structure” —
of distribution formulae. It is no more than an artifact of the symbolism we
happen to employ — with consequentialists happening to employ maximization
formulae, and opportunity-egalitarians happening to employ equalization
formulae. The fact that these formulae are interformulable suggests there is
a deeper structure to distribution manifest in that which is invariant when
different modes of formulation are employed. This structure is precisely
what is not “lost in translation” when we convert maximization formulae
into equalization formulae and vice versa.
What I have just suggested is further borne out by a few supplementary
considerations. First note that “deontology” refers simply to the logic — the
form, or structure — of duty, or obligation — deontos. “Consequentialism,” for
its part, refers simply to the conviction that consequences matter. Now note that
all imperatives, whether cast in maximization or equalization terms, are laid
down as obligations. Recipients of these imperatives are enjoined — are said
to be obligated — to “Max” this or “Eq” that. The obligations, in turn, speak
100 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2.
101 Id.
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to consequences. Utilitarianism lays down a duty to seek this consequence:
a maximized aggregate that is the sum of equally weighted individual utility
measures. Opportunity-egalitarianism lays down a schematically identical duty
to seek this substantively alternative consequence: a fair allocation of material
opportunity such as results in a maximized aggregate of equal-opportunitygrounded welfare. Both norms are as “consequentialist” as they are deontic,
and as deontic as they are “consequentialist”; they simply articulate duties
— deontoi — to seek different consequences.102 Were that not so, they would
be non-obligatory and inconsequential; they would enjoin nothing and make
no difference to anyone’s actions.
As for the putatively “ex post” orientation of “deontological” norms
and “ex ante” orientation of “consequentialist” norms, I confess to finding
it difficult to know what to make of the claim. I doubt any sense can be
made of it. It might bear noting, however, that opportunity-egalitarianism
speaks directly to the ex ante spread of opportunity, thereafter allowing
the ex post equal-opportunity-grounded welfare aggregate to “take care of
itself” via the welfare-productive choices of agent beneficiaries. It does so
precisely because it considers agent beneficiaries responsible for producing
the aggregate, in “decentralized” fashion, out of the ethically exogenous
opportunities antecedently distributed to them. Utilitarianism and latter-day
“welfarism,” by contrast, speak directly to the ex post welfare aggregate,
without regard for the ex ante spread of opportunity over responsible agents.
In that sense, things look to be quite the contrary — indeed the “reverse” —
of their characterization by “welfarists,” assuming I have managed to make
any sense of the characterization at all.

VI. Mechanisms of Distribution: Law and Institutions
I have already noted a distinction in thinking about “ought” and “can” in
connection with distribution. Somewhat surprisingly, normatively oriented
legal and policy analysts are largely silent on the subject of feasible distribution
mechanisms. This tends to undermine not only their persuasiveness, but in
some cases their very intelligibility. This is not simply because “can” limits
102 The term “consequentialism” as a name for utilitarian and cognate maximizing
imperatives seems to have been introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern
Moral Philosophy, 33 Phil. 1 (1958). Anscombe was, to be sure, a remarkably
penetrating thinker. But it is tempting in hindsight to conclude that her singling
out ethical systems by reference to their attention to consequences has ultimately
led to at least as much muddling mischief as salutary clarification.
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“ought.” It is also because failure to think one’s thoughts through to their
institutional upshots can conceal theoretic aporias.
Intriguingly, all of the best-known accounts of distributive ethics considered
above save one seem to fall prey to this danger. Only the opportunity-egalitarian
ideal avoids it. I suspect it is no accident that this ideal is also the only one
that, as already articulated, requires a specific configuration. More intriguingly
still, this configuration seems to constitute that institutional ideal toward which
the bulk of legal, policy, and institutional designing done in the name of the
public in democratic societies is directed. The mechanism that coheres most
closely with the most attractive distributive ethic emerging from the discussion
thus far amounts, in other words, to an ideal toward which we seem to have
been striving, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, all along. Call it
the ideal of an efficient, democratically regulated, endowment-neutral market.
Space constraints limit my capacity to substantiate these claims fully here.
But it is possible at least to sketch in broad outline how inattention to questions
of mechanism links up with theoretic unintelligibility in the cases of all
leading accounts of distributive ethics apart from the opportunity-egalitarian.
Let us begin with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, or naïve welfare
maximization, should in theory be willing to maximize welfare outputs by any
means necessary, since welfare-maximization is its sole recognized imperative.
The utilitarian planner is accordingly unconstrained by any preexisting right
or entitlement, since citizens amount merely to passive utility-factories. Yet
because of the earlier noted theoretic perplexities that attend any would-be
project of direct welfare measurement, it is indeterminate what actions taken
by any such planner actually could maximize the utility yield. The picture
we’re left with is thus simultaneously dystopian and vacuous: a government
stunningly empowered in principle, which for theoretical reasons cannot
perform the practical task upon which its power is predicated.
Prioritarian maximining views, including Rawlsian justice theory, fare
little better than utilitarianism along this dimension of assessment. Rawls
refreshingly acknowledged that his theory spoke only to what he called “the
basic structure” of society, but the problem is that operating at this level of
abstraction seems to leave the theory with little bite. Rawls seems to anticipate
that a just society will feature private property and market exchange; yet he
explicitly holds that his conception of a just order is as realizable in socialist
societies as in capitalist ones. Because he does not elaborate on this point,
however, we are left wondering whether we could recognize a Rawlsian
society upon seeing one. As with utilitarianism, then, the problem here is not
only that questions of implementation (or “second best”) are underspecified;
it is that even “first best” is underdetermined.
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Turning now to the other end of the specificity spectrum, one might
be tempted to think normative “law and economics” offers a solution to
utilitarianism’s and prioritarianism’s quandaries. In contrast to utilitarians
and prioritarians, normative economists of law attend with some care to
institutional micro-detail, leading to analyses of what might be the simplest
unit of institutional structure — the legal rule. Yet this turns out to be their
undoing. For while utilitarians and prioritarians miss the trees for the forest,
normative economists of law miss the forest for the trees.
The reason appears to be rooted in a fallacy of composition to which the
normative economist of law’s penchant for partial rather than general equilibrium
analysis evidently blinds him. Even if you know that a particular change in each
rule in a series of legal rules is, ceteris paribus, wealth-maximizing, it simply
does not follow that a combination of such changes will be wealth-maximizing
in comparison to some competing set of changes. That determination could
be made only if one were to consider full sets of interacting rules rather than
individual rules. Choices in nominally distinct legal domains cannot, in other
words, be blithely assumed to be linearly independent.
These observations highlight a gulf between the normative pseudo-ideal of
wealth-maximization as a macro matter and the normative evaluation of specific
distribution mechanisms (the rules) as a micro matter in mainline economic
analysis of law. This gulf is not accidental: it is rooted in a foundational
incoherence at the core of this school of normative thought. The fundamental
problem is that “wealth maximization” is itself normatively indeterminate
in macro. One simply cannot prescribe an initial distribution of entitlements
on the basis of that distribution’s effect upon “total wealth,” any more than
one can make sense of the claim that, say, “cats are better than dogs” absent
some implicit answer to the question “better for what?”
The reason is that “wealth” cannot be defined until after an antecedent
assignment of legal entitlements has already been made: there is literally no
intelligible concept of “wealth” available to normative economics of law that
does not presuppose an antecedent distribution, because the “willingness to pay”
upon which wealth hinges is itself a function of some such prior distribution.
It is, in other words, endogenous, and hence affords no exogenous platform on
which to ground a comprehensive normative vision of appropriate distribution.
There is, then, no “wealth” aggregate for the normative economics of law
to employ as a prescriptive touchstone in deciding how to distribute legal
entitlements. Normative economists of law cannot prescribe a macro-distribution
of legal entitlements; they can speak only to isolated micro-changes wrought
relative to prior backdrops of entitlements. In the end, then, normative economics
of law is as prescriptively sterile as utilitarianism and prioritarianism. Its
ineluctable micro-orientation leaves it as incapable of grounding a determinate
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distributive ethic as utilitarianism’s and prioritarianism’s ineluctable macroorientation leave them.
Again, then, insufficient attention to the deep internal relations among
practical distribution mechanisms on the one hand, the “ought” and “can”
of distribution discussed above on the other, results in a blind spot that
prevents theoretical progress. We fail to notice that certain familiar would-be
distributive prescriptions are not merely difficult to implement, but in fact
misfire at the stage of prescription itself. We get nowhere until we work to
specify completely the valuations of all of the variables opened up by the
question of distribution — the variables discussed in Parts II through VI. On
then, to that final task.

VII. Convergence and Completeness:
What We Appear to Be Groping for
The previous Part’s last observations might seem to warrant some pessimism.
In light of the just-catalogued failings of normative distributional theories thus
far to prescribe anything determinate with respect to distribution mechanisms,
one might conclude that the problem is simply intractable. This would, however,
be premature. For as I shall demonstrate in this Part, there does seem to be
at least one mechanism that determinately realizes the best vector of values
that fill the distributive variables discussed over Parts II through V.
This turns out to be more than a mere happy accident. For the precise
ways in which this mechanism vindicates those values highlights yet further
the senses in which those values are attractive. That constitutes an attraction
additional to the more practical advantages this mechanism offers in giving
expression to the values in question. What is more, I shall at least preliminarily
indicate, our laws, policies, and institutions appear to be animated, at least
inchoately, by a shared societal commitment to realizing something much
like this mechanism.
A. Material Opportunity Spreading
Let us begin with a specification, in ideal form, of the mechanism that I have
in mind. Assume first, for heuristic purposes, what is known in the literature
as a “complete” market. All, and only, desired transactions can be effected.103
103 Market “completeness” in this sense includes trading in contingent claims,
more on which over the course of the next several paragraphs. I also argue that
completeness in this sense is a function, in part, of what I shall presently label
“neutrality,” a fact which appears to go largely ignored. The classic sources on
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Assume further that these transactions are in, first, all goods and services
that can practically be made available and that anyone values. These would
accordingly be, in the terminology of Part IV above, all things that might
count as distributed benefits.104
Assume also that our complete market’s transactions include trading in,
second, what are known in the literature as “Arrow securities.”105 These are
contingent claims to compensation upon the occurrence of eventualities that
beneficiaries might disvalue — what we called “burdens” in Part IV above.
The compensation is payable by anyone willing to take the opposite sides of
what are functionally equivalent to “bets” on the disvalued contingencies’
occurring.106
Let us assume next that the market that I am now specifying also is “neutral,”
in two senses I now explain. It is neutral, first, in the sense that each participant
enters this market with an initial endowment of ethically exogenous assets —
the “material opportunities” of Section IV.C. — equal in value to that with
which everyone else enters it. I call this form of neutrality entry neutrality.
Assume that our ideal market also is neutral in this, second sense. The law
the role of contingent claims in completing markets are John R. Hicks, Value
and Capital (1940); Maurice Allais, Généralisation des Théories de L’Equilibre
Economique Général et du Rendement Social au Cas du Risque [A Generalization
of Theories of General Economic Equilibrium and Economic Efficiency to the
Case of Risk], 11 Econometrie, Colloques Internationaux du Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique [Econometrics, Int’l Conf. Nat. Ctr. Sci. Res.]
81 (1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières par la Répartition la
Meilleure des Risques [The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk
Bearing], 11 Econometrie, Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de
la Recherche Scientifique [Econometrics, Int’l Conf. Nat. Ctr. Sci. Res.] 41
(1953); and Gerard Debreu, Theory of Value (1954). Completeness is more
precisely characterized by formal means. Its presence bears many ramifications,
only some of which can be treated here. For fuller treatment, see Robert Hockett,
Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l. Econ. L. 107
(2004). For state of the art plenary treatment, see Michael Magill & Martine
Quinzii, Theory of Incomplete Markets (1996).
104 Assume also, for obvious reasons, that valued “goods” and “services” do not
include among them the nonconsensual expropriation of others’ entitlements,
which would violate the neutrality conditions I next describe. I’ll also explain
how to apportion and determine entitlements, hence what counts as expropriation.
105 Robert Hockett, Real Arrow-Securities for All: Just and Efficient Insurance
Through Macro-Hedging, 34 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 609 (2015).
106 Id.; see also sources cited supra note 103 (in particular Hockett); Robert Hockett,
Gaming as Micro-Insurance: How and Why to Regulate, not Eliminate, Online
Gambling (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
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works to prevent any collusively, strategically, or expropriatively opportunistic
behavior as might yield the following consequence: some participants’ coming
to possess greater or lesser holdings, or price-affecting effective demand powers,
than are traceable solely to (a) the participants’ ethically exogenous initial
endowments, and (b) their ethically endogenous — that is, their responsible
— transaction histories. I call this process neutrality.107
I claim that this mechanism straightforwardly instantiates a particular set
of valuations of the distributive variables discussed above in Parts II through
V. What is more, it enables us straightforwardly to sidestep the measurement
noted earlier in connection with sundry proposed objects of distribution. It
does so in a manner that no other mechanism instantiating the competing
values discussed in Parts II through V can so much as begin to attempt. I now
substantiate these two claims.
First, consider those valuations of the distributive variables to which I
alluded. The mechanism honors beneficiaries as boundedly responsible agents,
as characterized in Section III.A. Beneficiaries transact voluntarily pursuant
to their own relative valuations of material goods, ills, and contingencies that
they prefer and disprefer. What is more, anything that they hold or enjoy at any
given moment is a function of those same valuational and transacting decisions.
The mechanism also treats as distributed benefits whatever goods or services,
including risk-bearing services, that our agent-beneficiaries themselves value
or disvalue, so long as their coming by these does not violate either of the
two forms of neutrality defined a moment ago. These goods and services
are, accordingly, just those resources or material opportunities described in
Sections IV.B. and IV.C. They are that from which, pursuant to their own
market-neutrality-consistent choices, agent-beneficiaries’ welfares derive.
Finally, the mechanism also, by dint of the entry neutrality imposed upon
it at the outset and the process neutrality retained by it throughout, equalizes
just what is ethically exogenous — that which is not traceable in the holding
directly to a responsible choice. At the very same time, and by dint of the
same forms of neutrality, it permits distributive shares to vary over time in
a manner traceable solely to ethically endogenous — that is, responsible —
valuational and transactional decisions made by agent beneficiaries. The
distribution formula to which the mechanism gives expression, in other
words, is the opportunity-egalitarian formula characterized in Section V.C.
Now consider how the mechanism allows us to sidestep measurement
challenges. First it sidesteps, in an ethically satisfactory way, the problem
107 Please set aside, just for the moment, the questions of means by which endowments
would be measured and endowment-equalization effected. We’ll get to those
shortly.
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of cardinal welfare measurement. It does so by enabling agent-beneficiaries,
through their own voluntary trading activity, to maximize their own welfare
in a manner that comports with two conceptually equivalent, normatively
required conditions. The first is ethically exogenous endowment equality
among market participants, per the opportunity-egalitarian requirement
characterized in Part V. The second, by way of corollary, is an equally shared
scarcity of the exogenously given resources from which agents “produce”
their own welfare.108 Now here is the proverbial rub: Maximization of this
normatively intelligible form of welfare109 is effectively “guaranteed” to occur
per our mechanism. This is an immediate consequence of the so-called “first
fundamental theorem of welfare economics.”110
The mechanism also sidesteps the problem of interpersonal welfare
comparison, in much the same way that it sidesteps the problem of cardinal
measurement. Provided that all material opportunity components of welfareproduction111 are counted112 among the exogenous endowments that must be
equalized over participants per the entry neutrality requirement, the following
will hold true as well: Whatever the absolute or comparative “quanta” of
welfare enjoyed by our beneficiaries, these will be the “highest” that they
can be consistent with Part V’s opportunity-egalitarian distribution formula
108 In essence, we are describing an economy characterized by so-called “equal
division Walrasian equilibria,” or “EDWEs.” The technical literature on the
theory of EDWEs and fair allocation more generally is vast, though curiously
ignored by economically oriented legal academics. A canonical sampling would
include: T.E. Daniel, A Revised Concept of Distributional Equity, 11 J. Econ.
Theory 94 (1975); Duncan Foley, Resource Allocation and the Public Sector, 7
Yale Econ. Essays 45 (1967); Elisha Pazner & David Schmeidler, A Difficulty in
the Concept of Fairness, 41 Rev. Econ. Stud. 441, 441-43 (1974); E.A. Pazner
& David Schmeidler, Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of
Economic Equity, 92 Q.J. Econ. 1 (1978); H.R. Varian, Equity, Envy and Efficiency,
9 J. Econ. Theory, 63 (1974); and H.R. Varian, Two Problems in the Theory of
Fairness, 5 J. Pub. Econ. 249 (1976). The work from which these studies take
departure is Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics (William Jaffé trans.,
1954) (1844). Walras appears to have anticipated, indeed even inchoately to have
intended, precisely such developments as these. See Willam Jaffé’s Essays on
Walras 17-52, 326-42 (Donald A. Walker ed., 1983).
109 For a reminder of the contrasting, normatively unintelligible form of welfare,
see supra Introduction and Part IV.
110 See Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare
Economics, in Proc. Second Berkeley Symposium 507 (1951).
111 Including physiological determinants.
112 For example, in the form of drugs, prostheses, or contingent claims to those and
other forms of compensation.
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and the accordingly equally shouldered constraints posed by the exogenously
given environment.
Finally, the mechanism “automatically” commensurates distributed benefits,
in the only way that ethically matters. How is that? It is via the implicit
comparative valuations of autonomously transacting agent-beneficiaries
themselves, in their trading behavior.113 We need not, in other words, even
concern ourselves with how much of some good G2 “would” or will compensate
person P1 for a deficit of good G1. Nor will we have, a fortiori, to attempt
to construct any “perfectionist” index of all such goods and ills.114 Instead
our beneficiaries themselves will, in effect, autonomously and with equal
voice, construct the only index that normatively matters — what amounts to
a spontaneously emergent price index reflective of equal initial endowments
on the part of all who in trading give rise to that index. So long as entry and
process neutrality are maintained, this index will effectively constitute the
ethically relevant “social” valuation of all tradable goods and services. That
in turn is a valuation in the construction of which each participant has in effect
exercised, by dint of the neutrality conditions themselves, an equal “vote.”115
B. Implementability and “Next Bests”
The idealized opportunity-egalitarian market mechanism just sketched,
then, insofar as it can be realized “on the ground,” simultaneously assists in
realizing what looks to be the most plausible vector of Part II through Part
V distributive values, while meeting or neutralizing each of the principal
measurement challenges noted earlier in connection with various proposed
objects of distribution. The precise manners in which it does so, moreover,
underscore the independent normative-theoretic attractiveness of those values
themselves — distributors and beneficiaries as boundedly responsible agents,
distributed benefits as material opportunities, and distribution formula as
opportunity-egalitarian.
113 See Hockett & Risse, supra note 42.
114 Id. The claim that the need to index commits one to perfectionism — the
proposition that some goods are inherently more worthy of collective pursuit
than others — figures into a prominent criticism of Rawlsian primary goods
leveled by Arneson, supra note 77. The criticism is addressed in Hockett &
Risse, supra note 42.
115 Again, provided that there exist market completeness and neutrality in the senses
explicated above. Trading here is voting, and voting rights are equally spread
in the only sense that ethically matters —equal bargaining power involving the
apposite form of equality, viz., equality of ethically exogenous endowments.
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Two doubts, however, might seem to afflict one’s hope that this “ideal”
mechanism might be actually realized. I specify, then address, each of the
two challenges in turn. Doing so not only will serve to allay doubts, but will
also afford opportunity to note several additional attractive features of the
mechanism I schematize.
The first doubt has to do with the first form of market neutrality I mentioned
— entry neutrality. If, as I stipulate, we are to equalize holdings of the material
opportunity endowments with which agent-beneficiaries enter the market,
then surely we must commensurate those endowments. For different people
in the world we inhabit enter this world with radically different genetic and
other non-tradable attributes. But how are we to commensurate these distinct
endowments, with a view to compensating those who are under-endowed,
prior to the operation of the equal-endowment grounded market mechanism
itself? For is it not that mechanism itself that I have said affords us an ethically
satisfactory method of commensuration? Is there not a pragmatic indeterminacy
here just as vitiating as the foundational indeterminacies that I argued in Part
VI afflict utilitarianism, Rawlsian prioritarianism, and normative economics
of law?
Nope. I shall show why not in three steps. First, I demarcate certain classes
of material opportunity endowment that are unambiguously ethically exogenous
in the holding; I call them “core endowments.” Second, I indicate means by
which holdings of these can be readily equalized. Finally, third, I show that
any forward movement in these directions is unambiguous movement toward
the ethically optimal distribution. The upshot is that the ideal mechanism is
straightforwardly approachable in continuous, upward-sloped fashion.
On, then, to those core endowments. At least four classes of endowment
would seem to be uncontroversially ethically exogenous in the holding. First
are the genetic determinants and obstacles, so far as we can ascertain them
at a given time, of and to successful welfare-pursuit. Many handicaps are
obvious and incontestably undeserved; many talents are likewise incontestably
unearned. With the advance of empirical science, we grow ever more able to
sort out, at least probabilistically, what is predisposed and what is not.
Second are childhood healthcare and education. Children do not earn or
deserve greater or lesser access to such assets, particularly when they are
still very young. Their degrees of responsibility grow gradually as they move
toward adulthood. Third is inherited nonhuman capital — that is, moneyvalued wealth. Like other forms of inheritance this one is morally arbitrary;
it is a product of the birth lottery. Moreover, unlike educational opportunity,
it does not tend straightforwardly to be ethically endogenized with time and
maturation; there is no particular tendency for children to become more
deserving of the plenitude or meagerness of their money inheritances with
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age. Finally, the fourth core endowment is opportunity to shed or share
unforeseeable risk through trade or collective risk-pooling action — in other
words, the existence of insurance markets. This form of opportunity is best
seen for present purposes as non-confiscatory compensation for deficits in
other resources or material opportunity.116
Core endowments of these types are both tractable in principle and
manageable in number. Moreover, with the advance of empirical science
they grow ever more readily quantifiable, directly distributable, and indeed
equitably distributable. They are also in little need of commensuration inter se.
This is particularly so of the “beneficial” as distinguished from “burdensome”
core endowments — early education, healthcare, and inherited non-human
capital. The burdensome endowments are somewhat more difficult, since
they disproportionately include genetic, physiological “resources.” But they
too are not so unmanageable.
The most difficult of the latter, for example, likely is genetically poor health
or handicap. Some deficiencies of this sort can be roughly and preliminarily
valued by reference to current prices affixed to their mitigation — prostheses,
medicines, and the like. There seems no reason not to begin to address such
deficits with compensation equal to the going rates. Other such deficits
are of course not as readily mitigated. Here we will do best to estimate the
compensation afforded by insurance policies that typically are, or perhaps
“would,” be purchased against such contingencies.117
Clearly there is rough estimation afoot here, but that is not mere whistling
around in the dark. As medical and other forms of empirical knowledge develop,
we are gradually enabled to estimate with greater accuracy and reliability. We
do as best we are able to repair the ship at sea, as Otto Neurath might have
put it.118 The more repairing we do, in turn, the better the mechanism grows
116 Some seek to include the presence of counter-traders in the opportunity set
here. See, e.g., Colin M. MacCleod, Liberalism, Justice, and Markets: A
Critique of Liberal Equality (1998); Markovits, supra note 30. I think this
position mistaken — in effect, a retreat from the position from which one treats
beneficiaries as responsible agents — by dint of its treating co-citizens and their
responsible tastes as resources. So I count only infrastructure.
117 See Hockett, supra note 103, at 217-37; Dworkin, supra note 30, at 307-50. Real,
rather than “hypothetical” such insurance is proposed in Hockett, supra note 103;
and in Alexander Tabarrok, Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9 Contingencies
20 (1997). See also J.H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J.
Pol. Econ. 445 (1995).
118 The metaphor is taken from Otto Neurath, Antispengler (1921) (“We are as
sailors who are forced to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being
able to start fresh from the bottom up.”).
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at improving itself. I shall show this below in connection with “nth bests,”
thus completing my answer to the doubt concerning neutrality’s attainability.
First, I turn to the second doubt concerning the ideal mechanism’s realizability,
however. For my subsequent treatment of “nth bests” completes my reply to
this one as well — two birds with one stone.
The second doubt I raised in connection with the ideal mechanism’s
realizability takes aim at what I called completeness rather as the first one
takes aim at what I called neutrality. How reasonable, one might ask, is my
stipulation, per the completeness requirement, that “all and only desired trading”
occur? Is such a thing possible? If so, is it really desirable? Would we not,
for example, in order to realize it, have to abandon our market-inalienability
norms and “commodify” everything?119 For, absent that, will the opportunityegalitarian market mechanism that I have described be capable of discharging
the tasks I have assigned to it?
This doubt is more readily allayed even than that raised by neutrality. Take
the desirability half first, then the feasibility half. As to the desirability of
completeness, then, first consider the core opportunity endowments. These
are already subject to unobjectionable market-valuability already. We have
already “commodified” what most needs commodifying here. That is what
the markets for education, healthcare, health insurance, and so on amount to.
Next consider all else that might be traded. We can easily bracket away from
market transacting all things that we might adjudge ought not be commodified
— babies, blood, or human organs, for example — and still approximate to
distributing unobjectionably commodified goods and services in a manner
that permits the mechanism better and better to realize the ideal version I have
specified. For again, as I shall presently indicate, there are “second,” “third,”
and so forth all the way down to “nth bests” from the point of opportunity
equality that are ordered equivalently to ordered degrees of neutrality and
completeness.120 The former attribute, in other words, corresponds by degree
to degrees of neutrality and completeness. But back to that in a moment.
119 The classic contemporary objection to “commodification” is Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987). See also Michael
Sandel, Public Philosophy (2005). Contemporary protests of commodification
revive concerns raised repeatedly in the past. Two classic Victorian-era objections
are Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present (Robert Thorne ed., 1890); and John
Ruskin, Unto This Last and Other Writings 155-228 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985).
120 The baby allusion is of course to Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978), one of the
bugbears that prompted Radin, supra note 119. The blood and human organ
allusion is of course to Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human
Blood to Social Policy (1970).
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So much for the desirability half of the doubt concerning “completeness.”
The feasibility half is rooted in well-known transaction-cost and informationcost barriers to full market-completion in the technical sense. Here is a fuller
articulation: Is it reasonable to suppose that all parcelings of tradable goods,
and all possibly desired claims to payment defined in terms of specifiable
contingencies, might be rendered tradable? Can we really “complete” markets
in the sense you require?121 There are several ways to handle the doubt as
thus technically articulated.
First note that it is a long since established theorem of modern financial
theory, as rooted in general equilibrium theory and stochastic calculus, that
complete markets can always be simulated through a comparatively small
number of hedging strategies.122 Furthermore, many more contingent claims
markets — particularly those whose present supply would be either in the
nature of a public good or subject to some other collective action problem in
the inception — can be provided in principle than are actually provided.123 It
also bears noting that the number of such claims that can be traded is all the
time growing. I exploit those facts elsewhere in making concrete proposals
to “jump-start” new forms of insurance market that enable people of humble
means to shed risks as readily as large business institutions already manage
to do.124
Next note that greater entry-neutrality itself yields greater completeness.
The reasons are several. For one thing, completeness rides in part upon all
desired trading’s being available. But more trades per unit of wealth occur at
lower levels along personal wealth curves — that is the upshot of Keynes’s
canonical observations concerning the “marginal propensity to consume.”125
And this means that entry neutrality itself opens market doors to larger numbers
of participants who enter at the low end. Hence greater entry neutrality results
in more trade.
121 I thank Henry Hansmann for first pressing me on this score.
122 See Robert C. Merton, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty: The
Continuous-Time Case, 51 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 247 (1969); Robert C. Merton,
Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model, 3 J.
Econ. Theory 373 (1971); Robert C. Merton, Continuous-Time Portfolio Theory
and the Pricing of Contingent Claims (A.P. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., MIT, Working
Paper No. 881-76, 1976).
123 See Hockett, supra note 103; Hockett, supra note 106.
124 See Hockett, supra note 103; Hockett, supra note 106; see also Hockett, What
Kinds of Stock-Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and
“Ownership Societies,” 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2007).
125 For more on this, see Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: An Essay in Constructive
Retrieval, 16 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2013).
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Finally, and most decisively of all, any added degree of completeness at
all, just like any added degree of neutrality, renders our mechanism more
opportunity-egalitarian. There is no worry, in other words, of the sort Hart long
ago noted to afflict moves toward greater completeness where Paretian criteria
provide our would-be standards of normative assessment. Specifically, Hart
showed that some moves in the direction of greater market completeness can
result in Pareto losses.126 But a Pareto loss, of course, is not an opportunityegalitarian loss, and it is only losses of the latter sort that should concern us.
And it is easily proved that any gain where either completeness or neutrality
are concerned constitutes an opportunity-egalitarian gain.127 As for Pareto
losses, these are altogether uninteresting from a normative point of view —
for precisely the reasons that naïve wealth- and welfare-maximization, per
Part V above, are normatively sterile.
C. Institutional Competencies and the Role of Law
I mentioned above that there are additional, side benefits offered by reflecting
with care about how a society might institute that distribution mechanism which
gives most direct expression to the most plausible distributive ethic. Among
those benefits is the fact that, as it happens, we notice in thinking through the
ideal mechanism sketched just above that the laws, policies, and institutions
that we find in all the most advanced political and economic systems look as
though they are intended to realize, or at any rate approximate, precisely some
such mechanism.128 If I am right about this, then thinking along the lines I
have just done in Sections VII.A. and VII.B. offers further advantages as well.
One such advantage is its positioning us better to understand and interpret
our own legal tradition, and so to carry it forward in manners that well — or
even better — cohere with its own animating ideals. Another, related such
benefit is its positioning us to improve the laws, policies, and institutions
that we have, with a view to rendering the composite distribution mechanism
that we have all the more complete and more neutral, and thus more fully
expressive of its own opportunity-egalitarian ideal. Finally, a third such
126 See Oliver Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure
Is Incomplete, 11 J. Econ. Theory 418 (1975).
127 Robert Hockett, Completeness, Neutrality, and Ethically Cognizable Efficiency:
An Ordinal Equivalence Theorem (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
128 We might say, then, that early normative economics of law was positively
incorrect in a manner precisely analogous to that in which it was normatively
incorrect.
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benefit is its positioning us all the better to see what mainline economics
of law, influential school of thought that it is, has got right and got wrong,
thus better to configure that important and potentially helpful methodology
itself in a manner that leaves it less prescriptively mute than has been since
its inception.
Let me, then, at least preliminarily elaborate these three suggestions. To
begin with the first, interpretive claim, much familiar private-law doctrine
seems to be quite transparently opportunity-egalitarian and responsible agencyvindicating in character. With respect to responsible agency, for example,
consider the centrality of the concept of “diligence” across property, contract,
and tort doctrine. Consider also the doctrines of adverse possession in property,
mitigation of damages in contract, and comparative negligence in tort. Even
our law’s presumptive favoring of freedom of contract seems rooted in respect
for autonomy, which of course is another name for responsible agency.
As for opportunity-equality, consider the treatment of bargaining power and
capacity in contract and testamentary law. In remedies law, in turn, concern
for “making the plaintiff whole” per the compensatory damages regime looks
straightforwardly actuated by considerations of corrective justice, which sounds
in a form of equality. It is a matter of equalizing present circumstances to a
status quo ante deemed to have been unfairly displaced as a procedural matter.
The many doctrines of equity jurisprudence that pervade our law are also of
course transparently equalizing of exogenous circumstance and vindicating
of responsibility. And that is, of course, just what the term “equity” and the
doctrines’ Aristotelian roots would have led one to expect.129
When we shift attention from private to public law, it looks once again as
though legislators for decades, if not indeed over a century, have been guided
implicitly by the aim of constituting something much like the ideal mechanism
sketched earlier in this Part. The best reading of most market-regulatory norms
in advanced political economies, for example, would seem to be as attempts
to afford something like greater neutrality — at least process neutrality, and
to some extent entry neutrality as well — and completeness of the sorts
described in Section VII.A. Laws prohibiting invidious discrimination on
the basis of racial, gender, and other ineluctable or morally arbitrary traits,
for example, are obvious cases of process-neutrality protection. Progressive
and inheritance taxation, public education, the Land Grant and Homestead
Acts, and our many forms of government-provided or —supplemented social
insurance — health, retirement, and unemployment in particular — for their
129 For more on the Aristotelian roots not only of equity jurisprudence, but of
Anglo-American private-law doctrine more generally, see James M. Gordley,
Philosophical Origins of Private Law (2006).
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parts appear to be aimed at promoting entry neutrality. They work to bring
more equalization of ethically exogenous material opportunity endowments
— the “Ri” of Section V.C. — over the citizenry. These neutrality-assisting
measures, moreover, for reasons noted in Section VII.B. help enhance market
completeness as well.
There are other completeness-enhancing measures that advanced political
economies have taken in recent decades and, in some cases, even centuries.
The history of the law’s treatment of “commodification,” for example, seems
by and large to have been to permit, and in many cases even to foster, the
trading of more and more goods and services, including contingent claims.
Witness, for example, the way our federal government created the secondary
debt “securitization” markets beginning in the 1930s and proceeding into the
1970s, for example, in order to lower the cost of credit for home mortgage.
Note also the government’s funding of research that has led to the design of
publicly important derivative hedging instruments in this connection.
The trend where “commodification” is concerned also has been to “unbundle”
more and more previously conjoined items into separately traded items.
Conspicuous cases of this form of market-completing include government
startup and subsequent regulatory support for active markets in government
securities, followed by corporate securities, followed in turn by derivative
securities, and now even tradable pollution rights, for example. Conspicuous
cases of mandated unbundling — which, incidentally, show yet again the
linkage between neutrality and completeness — include antitrust action against
large telecommunications concerns in the 1980s and software manufacturers
in the 1990s, as well as competition law more generally.
The fact that such measures can often be argued to enhance aggregate
social welfare, wealth or consumer surplus should neither surprise us nor be
taken for a value that our law pursues instead of completeness and neutrality.
Nor, relatedly, should it be taken for unambiguous evidence that legislatures
or common-law judges do, let alone ought, to craft law, doctrine or policy
with a view to such goals at the expense of the completeness and neutrality
goals. Even less, then, should it be taken for encouragement to conceive
“improvements” with a view only to wealth maximizing. For we have seen
now that opportunity-indifferent maximizing is normatively empty — it is mere
forehead-height, so to speak. And we have seen that equal-opportunity-grounded
maximizing nevertheless overlaps, in part, with other forms of maximizing,
precisely by dint of its sensitivity to responsible welfare-generative agency.130

130 Recall that EDWEs, for example, happen also to be Pareto-efficient, as observed
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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This latter observation itself explains how “positive” economists of law
in the past might have come erroneously to suppose that common-law judges
have been subconsciously actuated by Kaldor-Hicksian wealth-maximizing
aims. Because of the just-mentioned overlaps, judges who have acted to
vindicate equal opportunity and responsible agency naturally could be taken
in many cases to be friendly to wealth-generation. For responsible agency is
generally wealth-generating. It’s just that our law fosters wealth by vindicating
the responsible efforts of responsible agents while also vindicating the equal
opportunity backdrop the opportunity-egalitarian ideals guarantee to responsible
agents, in the forms of entry and process neutrality. We could substantially
better focus and fine-tune mainline economics of law in a manner that finally
rendered it straightforwardly normatively salient, then, by interpreting our
legal arrangements as being aimed at edging us closer to the responsible
agency, equal opportunity ideal, and framing our own efforts at improvement
in keeping with the same.
If I am correct in what I suggest here, then a substantial new research
agenda is opened for what we might describe as an “ethically intelligible
economics of law.” Some actual or proposed rules that have been deemed
“wealth-maximizing” in what amount to ethically uninteresting ways, for
example, will prove to be transparently suboptimal or otherwise problematic
when viewed under the aspect of the opportunity-egalitarian ideal. By the
same token, responsive amendments to such rules will appear well suited
to carrying us closer to full realization of the ideal opportunity-egalitarian
mechanism schematized above. Counterpart remarks hold in respect of our
efforts to interpret and extend the rules that we have, as well as to conceive,
legislate, and implement the best new policies and programs that we can.
Let me close this discussion of distribution mechanisms by emphasizing
what I am not claiming. I am not suggesting that courts attempt to make
general determinations of litigants’ overall material opportunity allotments in
deciding cases. Even less am I suggesting that courts should decide winners
and losers at trial on the basis of such assessments. Courts are not instruments
of non-case-specific compensation or distribution. Nor do I think what I have
said thus far to warrant any claim to the effect that legislators as a general
rule should always amalgamate all spheres of citizens’ lives in their policy
thinking, such as might lead them to prescribe, say, that citizens who fare
unjustifiably poorly in one sphere are entitled to be held to different standards
in other spheres, all so that they may be “compensated overall.” I doubt that a
legislature is fit with any precision to take on the role of opportunity-egalitarian
general equilibrium theorist.

222

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 18:157

In fact, my gut intuition, which I hardly think idiosyncratic,131 tends to sweep
the other way. I think that the integrity and long-term stability of legislative
programs and institutions that operate in any of the many different “spheres”
of human endeavor that jointly constitute a pluralist society often actually
proscribe our determining individuals’ outcomes in one sphere by reference
to their outcomes in other spheres.132 I accordingly think that realizing full
opportunity-equality among responsible citizen-agents will generally require
that we work severally — but also simultaneously — toward opportunityequality on a “sphere by sphere” basis. I say “severally” for the sake of
institutional integrity sphere by sphere. But I also say “simultaneously,”
because the opportunity-egalitarian ideal is general in its sweep, precisely
because there are so many distinct kinds of material opportunity which are
all of them nonetheless opportunities.
The full opportunity-egalitarian ideal is accordingly best realized in each
sphere when well realized in all spheres.133 My guess is that broad understanding
of this basic truth on the part of legislators will itself serve to encourage much
in the way of the needed simultaneity. For against such a “values” backdrop,
all legislation might reasonably be expected to reflect our most fundamental
political and economic value — that of equal material opportunity enjoyed
by ethically equal responsible agent citizens.
But the present Article, alas, is of course not the place to commit to
much more than these very general, provisional observations. Much more
consideration is required to arrive at a suitably full set of “principles of morals
and legislation.” My claim at this juncture is accordingly rather more modest.
It is simply that, where rules or programs or policies are crafted or drafted, the
crafting and drafting should be done with equal regard for citizens conceived
as boundedly responsible agents. That claim would seem to entail one more
claim: namely that judges, legislatures, and administrative agencies should,
while bearing in mind the institutional distinctions between their distinct
roles, also remain mindful of what all of these roles — as public roles — have
in common. That shared role would seem to be this: First, to equalize such
benefits and burdens as both (a) functionaries are themselves institutionally
131 Indeed, I take the intuition to be broadly Toquevillean, and perhaps in that sense
particularly “American.”
132 Others who seem to think so include, for example, Jon Elster, Local Justice
(1993); Alistair McIntyre, After Virtue (1979); David Miller, Principles of
Social Justice (1999); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (1983); and H.
Peyton Young, Equity in Theory and Practice (1996).
133 For reasons discussed in Part VI above, in connection with the non-independence
of domains.
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authorized to bestow or impose, and (b) are ethically exogenous in the holding
by those citizens in regard to whom the particular functionaries are acting. And
second, simultaneously to dispense in proportion to differential responsibility
such ethically endogenous benefits and burdens as the functionaries are
institutionally authorized to bestow or impose. And one way of rewording this
articulation of the shared role, in light of the foregoing discussion, is to say
that legal doctrine and legislative policy ought generally be elaborated with a
view to broadening the reach, and improving the operation, of the composite
ideal distribution mechanism that I have schematized and elaborated upon
in this Part.
These observations also bear some possible implications for a thus far
inconclusive discussion on institutional roles that has been taking place in
the legal-economic literature over the past decade or so. One strand of this
discussion argues that courts are better suited to maximizing aggregate wealth
in the incremental crafting of legal doctrine, while distributional concerns
are for their part more efficiently handled through tax policy.134 I must defer
thorough discussion of such questions to subsequent work, but two brief
comments seem warranted in light of the foregoing discussion.
First, in light of what has emerged over the previous pages — Part V in
particular — the particular understanding of “efficiency” at work in these
debates simply will not bear any normative import if decoupled from the
responsible agency, equal material opportunity ideal. For the aggregate in
question in such case will be morally arbitrary — like forehead height.
Second, assigning distributional tasks on the one hand, and naïve maximizing
tasks on the other, to separate institutional spheres raises at least two significant
moral risks. One is that the normatively intelligible maximandum itself cannot
be identified apart from the equal material opportunity backdrop against which
normatively relevant maximizing activity on the part of responsible agents
takes place. Another is that the institutional decoupling of welfare or income
reward from discrete transactional settings tends to undermine the continued
practice of responsible agency itself. For agents tend only occasionally to
think in “big picture” terms, while most of the time hankering for “proximity”
134 For recent discussion of this long-contested claim, see, for example, Chris
W. Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More
Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797 (2000); and Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821 (2000).
Fuller consideration would require discussion of the sizeable optimal taxation
literature, in particular the contributions of Hammond, Mirrlees, and Vickrey.
Regrettably I must pass this over in silence for now.
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between responsible act and just consequence. If one needs proof of this
observation, she need only read some of the experimental economics literature
on “framing effects,” or consider the strange co-presence of attachment to
equal opportunity on the one hand, resentment of “death taxes” and the like
on the other, among many middleclass Americans.
These observations appear to suggest that a practical corollary might be
implied by the “granular” character of that mechanism I have been arguing
bests instantiates the responsible agency, equal opportunity ideal. Call it a
principle of consequence-proximity, or perhaps subsidiarity: Rewards to
responsible agency should, in general, follow as “proximately” to particular
exercises of such agency as possible. For only in that case do we minimize
the need for “all things considered” reflection on the part of citizens who
wonder about the justice of what they receive or relinquish by dint of public
action each week. I think it no accident that the want of precisely this form
of proximity turned out to be one of the flaws we observed earlier to vitiate
veiled-choice distribution scenarios like Vickrey’s, Harsanyi’s, and Rawls’s. By
the very same token, it is no accident that its tying transaction-by-transaction
distributive changes as closely as possible to the voluntary transactions that
immediately produce them was part of what recommended the more microdetailed distribution mechanism that has been this Part’s preoccupation.

Conclusion
We have surveyed a rather broad terrain here. But as must now be apparent,
there is much ground to cross over and clear. And clearly much more must be
done. Indeed, if I am right in what I have been arguing in this Article, there
is much more to do than we have hitherto realized. For it seems we’ve been
on the wrong track for a while, where the normative theory of law’s links to
economic activity are concerned. For decades, we have been fixated on endstates that are not only unmeasurable, but in fact normatively uninteresting
even as aims. And all the while we should have directed our gaze toward
more ethically salient opportunity “inputs,” whose right distribution allows
rightful “outputs” to take care of themselves.
If collective action through law affects allocations of benefits and burdens
to our fellow citizens, then we cannot help but think through the ethics of
distribution in aiming to “do the right thing.” It is incumbent upon us, in
other words, to “take distribution seriously.” And if we find, on analysis,
that distributive ethics call for significantly improved spreads of material
opportunity, it is just as incumbent that we think through how this can be
done. Distributive ethics and feasible distribution mechanisms, in short, hang
together, as Parts VI and VII sought to make plain.
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But now consider the breathtaking sweep of the research agenda that
these observations open for legal theory. What are the principal determinants
of veritable, equal-opportunity-grounded wellbeing — the real material
opportunities of Part IV? What means can we develop for more accurately
charting the boundary between ethically exogenous and ethically endogenous
such opportunities — between chance and choice as were traced over Parts III
through V? How might we design better means of spreading the former, so that
the latter — the sole ethically intelligible maximand — might “automatically”
be maximized as described over Parts V through VII? What institutions, of
the sorts broached in Parts VI and VII, will be better at discharging which
functions in this project? And how much functional specialization of the sort
that renders institutions less transparently part of just wholes, in the language
of Section V.D. and Part VI, can endure? All of these questions and others
press with new urgency, the moment we see that they cannot be dodged if
we wish to be ethically coherent.
For far too long now — nearly two centuries, in fact — Benthamite
misdirection, Paretian complacency, and the latter’s more recent bedfellow,
Kaldor-Hicksian wealth fetishism, have functioned as balls and chains,
handicapping our hopes to make legal-theoretic inquiry something that might
recognizably better our institutions and lives. They have conferred vetoes upon
beneficiaries of morally arbitrary distributions — distributions of genetically
endowed utility functions, productivity functions, and wealth — for what we
now see to have been literally no normatively cognizable reason whatever. Now
that we see these constraints are not only unnecessary, but in fact incoherent
and indeed incompatible with normative prescription itself, we see as well
that it’s high time to jettison them.135
Consider how breathtakingly freeing this will be. It will free us and our
fellows as persons and as citizens — whose lives and life prospects, as well
as whose ethical roles relative to one another — will be vastly improved. It
will free us as lawyers, legislators, and scholars as well — whose lifework
will grow vastly more practically useful, theoretically sound, and indeed
genuinely edifying. Consider finally what this will mean for law, politics, and
economics. All three will be once again reconciled to their origins, in ethics.
All three will be, once again, what once they were seen clearly by all to be
— moral sciences.136 They will be healthy again. They will have come home.
135 See Hockett, supra note 1; Hockett, supra note 2.
136 Ethics, politics and economics were of course once united under the Cambridge
“Moral Sciences Tripos.” See, e.g., Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes
(1983). And, of course, Adam Smith, seemingly the patron saint of Chicago,
lectured and wrote not only on political economy, but upon ethics and jurisprudence
as well.

